

## 一个案例和一场展览：

黑色景观及其他当代景观类型

### Landscape Noir and other Contemporary Genres as Seen through One Case and One Exhibition

亚当·鲍贝特

香港大学建筑学院园境建筑学部助理教授

Adam BOBBETTE

Assistant Professor Faculty of Architecture, Division of Landscape Architecture, the University of Hong Kong

翻译 Translated by /

蔡金栋 Jindong CAI

校对 Proofread by /

陆小璇 Xiaoxuan LU

摘要 ……

2006年，拉宾多公司开始在印尼东爪哇省小镇徐图利祖县郊外进行天然气勘探钻井。然而勘探活动引发泥火山喷发直至今日，造成几千人移民他乡且未获赔偿，村庄、工厂及农田被淹。当地人不得不面对灾害持续存在这一新的现实，而政治界及政府当局充斥着腐败，设计师及其他专家却使现实情况更加混乱。这一深入的案例研究与最近题为“应急计划：居于动土之上”的展览有关。该展览深入分析了类似的当代景观，我认为如果以“黑色”及“谬误的黑色喜剧”此类当代景观的角度来解读，会获得更多富有成效的理解。

关键词 ……

黑色；黑色喜剧；类型；应急

Abstract ...

In 2006 Pt Lapindo Brantas began exploratory drilling for natural gas outside of Sidoarjo, a small town in East Java, Indonesia. Its activities created a mud volcano which continues to erupt today and has displaced thousands without compensation and submerged villages, factories and agricultural land. This disaster persists and has created a new reality for its residents where corruption rules politics and government and design specialists and other experts exacerbate it. This extended case study is then related to a recent exhibition *Contingency Plans: Or, Living with Unstable Grounds* which analyses in depth similar contemporary landscapes which I argue can be productively understood in terms of contemporary landscape genres of noir and dark comedy of errors.

Key words ...

Noir; Dark Comedy; Genre; Contingency

看到那段视频时，我和帕克·阿瓦尔正在他家客厅里喝着热甜茶。当时他的妻子伊布·因达在屋前门廊上做什工作——给假冒名牌运动包缝拉链，小孩则在一旁帮忙整理分堆。我们在屏幕上看到的是一个以纪录片手法拍摄的夜晚场景：高如楼房的火焰盘踞在画面中央，相机努力捕捉火焰的画面，但传感器质量低劣，很难对焦在火焰上。画面模糊不清。挤在镜头近处的人群注视着大火。有的人跑着，有的人则四处张望，似乎在找寻能对此事负责的人。我们没有看到关于这场大火起因的解释。

后来我们才知道，视频拍摄到的是

一座火山的诞生过程。但不同的是，这座火山诞生于2006年，喷发出来的是火热的泥浆。地面翻滚着气泡，泥浆（含有大量金属与有毒物质的泥水混合物）如喷泉般涌出地面，四处流淌。这段视频拼接起当地一些拍摄记录，反映了在印尼东爪哇省泗水市南部边界的徐图利祖县稻田、村庄、工厂和铁路上泥火山的早期形成过程。房屋里满是泥浆，卡车穿梭其中分发粮食物资，泥水淹没了人们的腰。这次爆炸的起因是“天然气气泡”在某户人家的地下点燃。一个令人难忘的场景是在一户人家的院子里接连几天上演的火山爆发的片断。院墙之外是由远处崎岖不平的小山

丘所构成的典型的清代轴侧山水画卷。院子中央的地面开始冒泡，如同火炉上的热锅，而后起伏不止，犹如哮喘一般。几日之后，地面活动更加剧烈，泥浆不断增多，使地面变为液化的泥浆涡流。墙体倒向泥水，犹如饼干漂浮在浓汤之中，然后吞没。

而今火山已被高墙围起，帕克·阿瓦尔一家也被迫搬迁至高墙的外侧区域。阿瓦尔骑摩托车带着我围着火山绕了一周，整片土地平坦辽阔，占地约8km<sup>2</sup>。我们走过的地方包括了这座火山的新旧边界——自2006年起外涌的泥浆逐渐淹没了先前所建的护堤，因而不得不新修土墙以阻挡泥

水外流，最终形成了一个被隔离的干涸泥湖。村庄、田地和工厂被掩埋在湖底。我们在离火山口最近的一处地方停了下来，白色的蒸汽不断飘向天空。一开始，我们站的地面还挺结实，但后来已变得松软而无法驻足。四周满是废弃的村庄，热带植被已悄然出现。约6m高的西墙守护着墙外的铁道和高速公路——它们通往泗水，这座距离当地最近的大城市。而北墙、东墙和南墙外仍是村庄和稻田，墙内硬化的泥湖呈现出土灰的颜色，平坦而干裂。泥地含有高浓度的苯、甲苯、二甲苯、重金属、氨和二氧化硫，寸草不生<sup>[1]</sup>。站在最高处环视四方，脚下是一片广阔静寂、烈日炙烤下的土地。若不是阿瓦尔讲解，我们无法知道脚下原本是一个个村落，而如今只看得见一片干枯灰暗的土地。远处蒸腾地方即为火山喷发之地，据此可以推断出泥浆扩散的范围。在喷发最剧烈的日子里，每天外涌的泥水高达18万立方米。到了2011年，喷放量已降至每日1万立方米。谁也不清楚火山是否会最终停止喷

发。创作于14世纪的爪哇史书《那加克塔加玛》中提到的1292年在爪哇岛南部出现的一座小型泥火山，至今仍在喷发。<sup>[1]</sup>

2006年，印尼能源公司拉宾多公司开始在东爪哇省徐图利祖县外围地区钻井勘探天然气。拉宾多是印尼最大的企业之一，其辉煌源自于苏哈托时期激进的开发政策和寡头政治经济体制。在这一时期印尼的景观、政治体制，以及经济管理之间的联系尤其密切。出现的新寡头包括布兰塔斯地区的阿布鲁兹亚尔·巴克瑞及其家族，在天然气、煤炭、石油、电子、地产开发、金融及电信等行业均有所涉足。就在地质学家递交勘探评估报告、第一批钻井设备开始进入徐图利祖县的时候，苏哈托早已在暴动与市区战争中辞去总统之职。然而，其后推行的改革并未给这个国家的寡头结构带来多少变化。巴克瑞就是一个很好的例子，他与包括苏西洛·班邦·尤多约诺总统在内的政府官员保持着密切的联系，因此能够在印尼国内四处钻井、开挖、筛选、铺设管线。讽刺的是，

巴克瑞竟然还在政府出任“人民福祉部部长”一职。巴克瑞一直是印尼国内最富有、最具政治影响力的家族之一。巴克瑞的宅邸位于雅加达市孟腾区某个街区的角落，为白色荷兰装修风格，至少从邻街围墙的建筑风格可窥得一斑。不远处即是苏哈托家族的大院，位于雅加达市中心，造价高昂，绿树成荫，尽显低调。与其他许多寡头一样，苏哈托也在这座曾经是荷兰殖民地的花园城市里购置了多处房地产。地质报告声称，这片土地上可以安全地进行勘探计划——自徐图利祖县地下200m深处开始埋设管网，并与全国管道网相接，最终接入孟腾地区。

帕克·阿瓦尔等几千户村民在房子被淹没后被迫迁出，住进临时搭建的避难所里，而这些避难所之后却成了这些难民永久的居住地。学校、工厂、养虾场、稻田以及与这些相关的生活全部被中断，一切都需要从头开始。许多人苦苦等待拉宾多公司的赔偿——因为他们认为拉宾多公司在当地进行的天然气开采正是引发这次灾

1. 脚下的土地开始变得松软。拍摄于2014年6月，地点位于距离火山口最近的地方。© Adam Bobbette
1. The edge at which solid becomes liquid. The closest the Lapindo vent one can get. June 2014 © Adam Bobbette



难的主因——却盼不来一分一毫的赔款。赔偿之所以迟迟未到，是因为对火山喷发的起因存在争议。法院无法确认责任，拉宾多公司拒绝绝对事件负责。

关于火山喷发的起因，存在两种解释。拉宾多公司声称火山喷发前两天在日惹地区发生的地震造成地壳不稳定，钻井只是加速了泥浆的喷发过程，而不是诱因。这种说法显然是拉宾多公司内部，或与这家公司有关联的专家所做的判断。第二种解释认为，火山毫无疑问是钻探活动引发的。拉宾多公司坚持第一种解释，从而将此次灾难定性为意外，因此无需负法律责任，而仅会提供道义上的帮助。拉宾多公司四面出击，动员专家代表公司发声、召开会议、发表论文，同时施加政治压力、拉拢政客并进行秘密交易，甚至坚持将此次火山喷发称为“徐图利祖泥石流”，而其他人士则将此次事件简称为“拉宾多”或“拉斯”（Lusi，在印尼语中，为“泥”的意思）。赞成第二种说法的人将责任矛头直接指向拉宾多公司。石油业内的地质学家在进行独立研究之后，得出的结论基本一致：不当操作和错误评估是此次火山喷发的主要原因。<sup>[2][3]</sup>

自2006年火山喷发以来，关于火山起因的争论陷入僵局，并形成了一段特殊的历史时期，没有人出面对此次事件负责，但当地人必须生存下去、必须寻求生活的意义。法律、政治与生活之间被撕开一道裂缝。泗水市城市扩张压力不断加剧并波及到徐图利祖附近地区和拉宾多事件爆发地。泥浆继续涌出，而拉宾多公司和巴克瑞家族则继续从旗下的其他公司获利。巴克瑞获得党内人士普拉沃沃·苏必安托亚斯的支持，后者反过来也为他的总统选举进行助选。关于火山起因的讨论陷入僵局，结论悬而未决，使得拉宾多公司能够推卸其应承担的责任，让徐图利祖县的居民自己解决问题——我这里所说的责任，不仅仅是基本的经济援助，还包括关怀、关心和帮助。这场起因尚无定论的灾难成为了人们生活中的负担：坐在公交车上的人不得不承受由于泥浆淹没道路所引

发的交通拥堵；而几乎每天都在关注拉宾多公司的消息，用摩托车载着和我一样的人绕着火山骑行似乎也成为了阿瓦尔的职责一般；被淹没的稻田和养虾场的所有者同样不得不为这场灾难买单。灾难的辐射影响范围越来越广。拉宾多公司针对此事不断投入大量资源，只为营造一个该公司并不需要为其自身发展以外的事承担任何责任的“事实”。火山持续喷发，可能永远不会停止。喷出的泥浆体量如此庞大，可能造成地面沉降，形成巨大的火山口。“灾难”（Disaster）的语源意义，正符合眼前的状况。“灾难”的本义是用来描述失去了用以导航的星辰的经历（其前缀“dis-”意为剥离，“asters”在法语中意为星辰）。从这个古老的意义上讲，“灾难”指的是在天地间迷失了航向。

比较无知学（Agnology）的研究对象是刻意造成无知的现象，这门学科对理解拉宾多事件十分关键。造成拉宾多事件的政治与经济体制不断制造无知，在一部分人图谋私利的同时损害其他人的利益。在无知与不确定性创造出的空间里，可以将后果倾卸到某些生命形态（Forms of Life）之上。（我用“生命形态”这个说法，是为了涵盖人类与非人类，因为他们都会陷于由“无知”所制造的困境）。长期以来，“认识论”（Epistemology）旨在对人类理解知识的过程进行描述与解释。而与之相对的“比较无知学”则认为，我们需要了解的其实是，无知的产物是怎样塑造公共生活的<sup>[4]</sup>。这门学科能够在很大程度上解释我们现在所处的景观，尤其是受制于无知的政治、经济与法律相互交织所制造的景观。拉宾多事件正是这些景观中的一个。那些认为应通过或在景观之中寻求具有实操意义的方案——简而言之，一个“设计”方案——的观点，实际上只会令困境进一步恶化，因为他们忽视了问题产生的根源。这种说法将事件归结于“不可知论”（Agnosis），即跟错了星辰。在拉宾多事件中，我们已经见得太多：例如，有日本专家建议，将混凝土球体扔入洞口，以制止喷发。实际上他们确实将这一

方案付诸实践，但却毫不奏效。还有一种方案是修筑高墙，以遏制泥浆流淌，但最终泥水还是漫过堤墙。更有人提出，应向洞口投放牲礼，以召唤神灵，制止泥浆外流，然而同样无济于事。人们竭尽办法，四处寻找外部力量，期望它们前来救局，却未考虑已在现场的因素。正如我和帕克·阿瓦尔一起观看的视频里，一开始就出现的那些人，只会茫然地望着夜空。

### 应急计划：居于动土之上

香港大学建筑学院上海学习中心于2014年3-6月举办了题为“应急计划：居于动土之上”的展览，“拉宾多的黑色景观”是此次展出的19个案例研究中的其中之一（这里简要说明这一展览的始末：我和达恩·罗杰维恩共同策划了“应急计划”展览，并提供了拉宾多事件以及香港滑坡事件的素材）。此次展览共包括19个案例，由20位研究人员及设计师合作完成，共展出大约200件展品，包括著作、手工艺品、树木、视频等。我在本文中针对此次展览发表的观点仅代表我个人的看法，不代表其他专家的意见和观点。本次展览关注的是当代景观设计学视野之外的一系列景观类型。过去十几年，景观设计学科的学术著述过多聚焦于当代的田园景观和画意景观（前者强调生产性景观，而后者强调真实景色和绘画间的差别）。而“应急计划”展览则转而关注其他的、甚至是与这两者毫不相关的景观类型，以了解当代的世界：“黑色景观”（Landscape Noir），以及“谬误的黑色喜剧”（Dark Comedy of Errors）。这些展出的案例首先呈现给我们一系列意外的景观事件：滑坡、冲蚀、火山、岛屿的形成。随后便对这些事件展开进一步分析，以揭示出“灾难”与政治、经济和技术体系之间错综复杂的关系。通过这种方式，本次展览避免了通常情况下对“灾难”暂时、片面的关注，以及当今关于“灾难景观”的讨论的局限性。展览所呈现的“意外”出现时，通常会由专家（比如工程师、景观设计师等）来到事件现场对这些不可预料的事件

进行管理；但这常常使情况变得更糟糕，或是引发新的不可预料的情况。灾难事件发生后便无法再次回到事件出现前的原始状态，而是会不断制造新的不可预料的现实。

在本次展览中我们可以看到，埃及实施历史性的沙漠化治理运动以应对粮食危机，却推动了近期的埃及革命暴动；地质工程师推出加固方案以应对香港的山体滑坡，却推动了房地产市场垄断的产生。同样，试图防止荒漠包围北京的抗击戈壁工程，似乎永远不可能实现，而这一过程中却体现了景观设计师无法抗拒“以大为美”的美学政治；美国新奥尔良近海“深水地平线”钻井平台漏油事件，在环环相扣的关系网络中，竟被转化为交易大厅中的利润。下文中我将详细介绍上述所提及的景观类型。

### 黑色景观

罗曼·勃兰斯基于1974年执导的《唐人街》是对洛杉矶黑色景观进行的一次较早的精彩刻画，同时也反映了这座城市早期的供水状况。在黑色电影中，演员的动机常常被隐藏，甚至于演员自身亦不了解动机为何。通过开展实地调查以了解情况的做法（即景观行业所谓的“场地分析”），通常未能发现足够的事实借以进行设计决策。相反，越了解越能发现事件所牵涉的各种暗含的秘密力量：所有人都为了一己私欲而参与到这场欺诈游戏之

中，即使是那些基于最善意出发点的人们。在这“黑色”中，政治只是为了特殊利益而进行的资本操纵：公民社会只是水中月、镜中花，死亡和牺牲成为与资本积累一同构筑这世界的一对元素；在这“黑色”中，死者成为试图了解事件背后由真正决策者所构成网络的群体。这即是“黑暗”是启蒙的“另一面”的原因：对这个世界的真实了解只会伴随死亡出现。被牺牲掉的人群包括阻碍资本积累过程的人（佃农、抵抗的农户、服务工作者），以及未料到有如此灾难的事件见证人、旁观者，或证人（那些知道事件真相的“背叛者”）。

### 谬误的黑色喜剧

在这些类型中，景观设计师总是以天真乐观的形象出现。他们总是渴望拥有更多权力，因为他们经常相信自己能把这个世界管理得更好。这种乐观主义很难以一种严肃、有意义的方式被讨论，因为这种乐观的基础是景观设计并不牢固的合理性——尽管长期以来这门学科一直试图使自己成为一种合理的理性活动。这种不安全感由来已久，因此当我们精心设计的方案和乐观的决定最终不仅无法实现，而且反倒成为罪恶现实的帮凶时，这些问题将更加难以启齿。

在“谬误的黑色喜剧”这类景观中，情况总会不幸地失控。景观设计师及其他设计师希望纠正方向、功能与价值，但

他们的本意在现实世界中被扭曲、改道、重新部署，从而违背了他们的初衷。这个世界中的行动者和原因总是戴着两张面具，可以随意变换外形，因而人们经常出现识别错误。事实上，干出这等蠢事的并非只是设计师，政府、非政府组织甚至军方也可能扮演这种愚蠢的角色。在这个世界里，管控必然招致不可预测的事件，意图总是投射回自身。嘲笑这种现象会令人痛心。这类景观可以有多种不同的表现形式，可以有多个不同的参与者，人类或非人类都与之相关。然而，这些景观均以失败而告终，而盲目乐观主义则是动力之所在。

“黑色”以及“谬误的黑色喜剧”两种景观类型，都缺少以解决方案为导向的景观设计学的乐观主义。或许这正是它们经常被忽略和无视的原因。然而，这并未减轻我们参与其创造或与其共存的负担。“应急计划”展览试图从侧面观察景观设计学科，从而折射现实。展览并非以提供解决方案、指出前行方向，或是重建一个由可信星辰所构成的稳定星系为目的。相反，这次展览希望用不同的视角看待事物，帮助我们想象出自己用不同方式创造和享用景观时所扮演的角色。讲述发生在这世界的故事的新方式，以及生活于这世界的新方式，将伴随新类型的提出而诞生。LAF

#### 注释

帕克·阿瓦尔与伊布因达均为化名。  
徐图利祖县是泗水市一个重要的延伸区域，而整个瓜哇岛是一个由农业和小规模生产交织而成的连续的城市体。这是一个农业科技中心，在水平方向上由其海岸线所界定（在这个层面上而言，这里是一个流动的“玛利亚之城”），在垂直方向上由其火山和险峻的山峰所界定（在这个层面上而

言，这里转变为一个政治信仰分歧的区域）。拉多宾公司是由其他三家公司组成：EMP石油公司（位于印尼，隶属于巴克瑞的公司），PT Medco E & P Brantas（印尼，起初由阿瑞芬·帕尼格罗所有，后转手给他的兄弟西尔密·帕尼格罗——他也是印尼民主斗争党竞选的参选人），以及Santos公司（位于澳大利亚）。其贷款主要

来源于瑞士信贷、巴克莱、美林、Natixis银行和富通等33家机构。  
罗曼·勃兰斯基的《唐人街》由派拉蒙影业公司1974年出品。也可参见描述黑色文学与电影发展的经典手法，以及其与洛杉矶历史的关系的著作——迈克·戴维斯的《石炭之城》（纽约沃索尔出版公司1990年出版）。

Pak Awal and I watched the video in his living room while drinking pints of hot, sweet tea. Ibu Inda<sup>①</sup>, his wife, did piece work on the front porch, sewing zippers into fake designer sports bags while the kids helped her sort and separate materials. The video we were watching depicts in a Cinéma vérité style a night time scene: a flame the size of a building is in the center of the image, the camera's poor quality sensors try to snap the flames into focus but quickly lose it. It is ghostly. People crowd the foreground watching the flame. Some run, some glance around searchingly as if to spot someone in charge. Nothing explains the cause of the flame.

Later, we understand that we are seeing the birth of a volcano. However, unlike most, this was created in 2006 and it erupts hot

mud. The surface of the earth bubbled, the mud (a mixture of water and silt laden with heavy metals and toxins) pushed through the surface then formed geysers, many of them. The film is a collage of locally produced video of the early days of the volcano's formation in rice paddies, villages, factories and railroads in Sidoarjo<sup>②</sup> on the southern fringe of Surabaya, East Java. Houses were filling with mud, trucks were driving through it to deliver food supplies to people wading up to their waist. The explosion was the result of a "bubble of natural gas" that ignited underneath someone's house. One memorable scene depicted, over days, a small fragment of the eruption in the courtyard of a house. A large classical Chinese landscape relief lined the courtyard wall with isometric, craggy mountains in typical Qing style. In the middle

of the courtyard the ground began to bubble like a pot of soup on the stove. Then it began to heave, rising and falling with the rhythm of an asthmatic. In a few days it grew more intense, the volumes of mud increased until it became a vortex of liquidified ground. They pulled the walls of the courtyard into the mud where, like crackers in soup, they floated then disappeared.

Pak Awal and his family had been relocated to the other side of the monumental earthen walls built to enclose the volcano. From his house we circumnavigated the

2. 泥浆第一次侵袭之后，在拉宾多附近的一个村庄迅速撤离。居民不得不在他们离开之前，将所有值钱和可变卖的物品和部分建筑结构转移。© Oscar Motuloh
2. An evacuated village at the edge of Lapindo shortly after the first eruption. Residents have removed all valuable and saleable materials from their houses before leaving, including parts of the construction. © Oscar Motuloh

volcano site on his scooter. It is flat and vast at roughly 8 km<sup>2</sup>. We covered its old and new edges; as the mud has flowed since 2006 and overtopped embankments, new earthen enclosures have been built to contain it, and created a segmented, dried mud lake. At the bottom are submerged villages, fields and factories. We stopped at the closest you can get to the vent and its white steamy plume permanently drifting into the sky. We stood at the edge before the solid ground turns too liquid to safely stand. The perimeter shows signs of tropical succession taking over evacuated and ruined villages. The western embankment — roughly 6 m tall, protects the rail lines and highway that lead directly to Surabaya, the nearest and largest city in the area. The northern, eastern and southern edges are still bordered by kampungs (villages) and rice fields. The vast petrified lake of mud inside is ash grey, cracked and flat. Nothing grows on it because of the concentrations of benzene, tolyene, xylene, heavy metals, ammonia and sulphur dioxide<sup>[1]</sup>. Standing on top of it you are encompassed in a vast horizon, silent and baking in the sun. There is only Pak Awal to tell me that we are standing on top of villages, otherwise erased by a new dry, grey earth. The plume in the distance indicates where it began and how far the mud has travelled. At its most volatile, it ejected 180,000 m<sup>3</sup> of mud per day. In 2011 it lowered to 10,000 m<sup>3</sup> per day. No one knows yet if it will stop. The *Nagarakertagama*, a 14th century Javanese text mentions the emergence of a small mud volcano in south Java in 1292 that continues to erupt today.<sup>[1]</sup>

In 2006, PT Lapindo Brantas<sup>③</sup> began exploratory drilling for natural gas outside of Sidoarjo. It is one of Indonesia's largest conglomerates and its ascendancy is owed to the aggressive Suharto era development policies and an oligarchic political-economic system. In this pro-development era the


links between landscape, the formal political system of the Republic and the management of the economy became especially tight. New members were inducted to the pantheon of oligarchs, including Abruzial Bakrie of Brantas and his family, who held interests in addition to natural gas, coal, oil, electronics, property development, finance and telecommunications. By the time the geologists submitted their assessment report and the first drills were entering the fields of Sidoarjo, Suharto had long abdicated his authority amidst riots and urban warfare. The Reformasi period which followed his fall made few changes to the country's oligarchic infrastructure. Bakrie, is a perfect example, with his close alliances in government, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was drilling, digging, sifting and piping across all Indonesia. Moreover, Bakrie was also in the government — as the darkly ironic Minister of Peoples Welfare. The Bakrie family remains one of the wealthiest and most politically influential in the country. They live in Menteng, Jakarta where his property wraps around a corner of a block in white Dutch deco style, or at least what can be seen over the perimeter walls that guard it from the street. Not far away, the Suharto family owns a compound, like many of the oligarchs, who filled the houses and properties of the once Dutch colonial garden city, some of the calmest, shaded and expensive real estate in Jakarta. The geological report that claimed the ground safe for exploration synched up a network that travelled from 200 m under the Sidoarjo ground to pipelines distributed across the country and finally to Menteng.

Thousands, including Pak Awal, were displaced as their villages submerged, and relocated to temporary shelters which have since become permanent. Schools, factories, shrimp farms, rice fields, and the lives

entangled with them have been interrupted and forced to re-organize. Many have sunken into a permanent state of waiting for compensation payments from PT Lapindo Brantas. They never arrive. This radical upsetting and prolongation of delay has been caused by a shadowy, contentious core, the missing origin of the eruption. No court has recognized liability and PT Lapindo Brantas refuses responsibility.

Two possible causes of the eruption continue to circulate. The Yogyakarta earthquake occurred two days prior to the eruption, PT Lapindo Brantas claims that it unsettled the geology and the mud flow was only accelerated by their drilling not caused by it. Unsurprisingly, it is experts working for or somehow tied to PT Lapindo Brantas that make this claim. The second claims that it was unequivocally caused by the drilling. PT Lapindo Brantas insists on the former, thereby making them and everyone else subject to an accident, and therefore not legally obliged — only morally, to help out. They have gone to war, mobilizing experts to speak on their behalf, held conferences, published papers, applied political pressure, cozied up to politicians and arranged back room deals. They even insist on calling the volcano the Sidoarjo Mudflow, while everyone else calls it just Lapindo or Lusi (from "lumper", mud in Indonesian). Those in favour of the second case, lay the responsibility directly on PT Lapindo Brantas. Overwhelmingly, independent studies by geologists working in the petroleum industry have all made this argument: shoddy practices and flawed assessments are responsible for the eruption.<sup>[2][3]</sup>

Since the eruption in 2006, it passes created by this contested origin have created a peculiar temporality in which no one is responsible but the necessity to survive and make life meaningful pushes forward on the



residents. A rift has been opened between the law, politics and life. The pressures of urban growth continue to push upon Surabaya, and by proximity Sidoarjo and Lapindo. The mud continues to flow and PT Lapindo Brantas and the Bakrie family continues to profit off their other companies. Bakrie is currently campaigning with Prabowo Subianto as a supporting party member in the current presidential election. The impasse of an undetermined causality allows the responsibility — and by this, I should clarify that I mean care, concern, and help, not just base economic support, to be offloaded by Lapindo onto the residents of Sidoarjo. This missing origin becomes the burden of the person riding the bus who has to sit in a traffic jam caused by the inundation of the road. It becomes the responsibility of Pak Awal who watches over Lapindo almost everyday and carts people like me around on motor bikes. It becomes the responsibility of the subsumed rice paddies and shrimp farms. It reverberates outwards from the hole. PT Lapindo Brantas has been directing its vast resources to creating a reality where it has no responsibility beyond the maintenance of its own growth. The volcano continues to erupt and may never stop. Its weight is becoming so immense on the surface of the earth that as geologists are currently suggesting it could subside, creating a massive crater. The etymology of disaster is instructive here. It speaks to the experience of losing stars to navigate with. The prefix “dis” means to peel away, to dislodge the “astres”, or stars in French. In this old sense, a disaster is to lose one’s way in a cosmos.

Agnotology is the study of the purposeful production of ignorance. It is essential for understanding the landscape at Lapindo in which the political and economic structures which created it produce ignorance to the benefit of some life forms over others. Non-

knowledge and uncertainty creates a space to unload consequence onto some forms of life over others. (I use here “forms of life” as a way to include both humans and non-humans, because they both experience the realities produced by non-knowledge.) In contrast to the prevalence of epistemology, which has sought for so long to characterize and explain how it is that we know what we know, agnotology, as the editors of a recent volume argue, that what we need to understand is how the production of not-knowing structures public life<sup>[4]</sup>. This has much to tell us about our landscapes. In particular, how it is that the intersections of politics, economics and law bound by non-knowledge, produce particular kinds of landscapes. Lapindo is one of these landscapes. To say that the solution would be in or through the landscape — a technical, operational, in short, a designed solution, is to further exacerbate the problem by missing the very source of its production. It is to contribute to the “agnosis”, to follow the wrong star. We have already seen so much of this at Lapindo: for example, Japanese experts suggested dropping concrete balls from the air into the hole, which they did, and it failed. Or, building walls to contain the mud, which they did and the mud overtopped them. Or, resorting to invoking gods through offerings into the pit to stop the flow, which they did, and it also failed. It is to look for any other actor, from anywhere, sometimes as far as possible, to arrive and save the day, rather than look to the actors there. It is to look into the night like the people in the beginning of the film I watched with Pak Awal.

### Contingency Plans: Or, How to Live with Unstable Grounds

The noir landscape of Lapindo was one of nineteen case studies included in the exhibition *Contingency Plans: Or, How to Live with Unstable Grounds* held

at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Architecture, Shanghai Study Centre in Shanghai (March ~ June, 2014). (A quick note for the sake of transparency: I co-curated *Contingency Plans* with Daan Roggeveen, as well as contributed the Lapindo case and one other about landslides in Hong Kong.) The exhibition featured nineteen cases contributed by twenty contributors including researchers and designers, displaying roughly two hundred objects including art works, artifacts, trees, videos and others. What I say about the exhibition here I take full responsibility for and cannot claim are the opinions or arguments of the other contributors. The exhibition focuses on genres of landscapes typically out of the purview of contemporary landscape architecture. In the past decade or so academic discourse in the discipline has been preoccupied with the contemporary pastoral and picturesque (the working landscape in the former and the slippages between drawing and landscape in the latter). *Contingency Plans* turns to other (if not always unrelated) genres to understand our contemporary world: “landscape noir”, and the “dark comedy of errors”. The cases begin with an unexpected landscape event: a landslide, erosion, volcano, the creation of a new island. The analyses then follow these events as they become entangled in complex political, economic and technical systems over time. This approach avoids the typically brief temporal and narrow minded focus on “disaster” or the limitations of risk discourses. Very often in the cases in the exhibition, an expert (engineer, landscape architect, etc.) steps in to manage an unpredictable event only to exacerbate or create new unpredictable entanglements. There is never any return to a prior state, there is only ever the production of new unexpected realities.

The cases include the food crisis that compelled the monumental de-desertification

of Egypt, which in turn compelled its recent revolutionary insurrection. It includes the landslides in Hong Kong which through their consolidation by geotechnical engineers compelled the monopolization of the property market. It includes the impossible project of stopping the Gobi desert from engulfing Beijing and the aesthetic politics of “massiveness” that landscape architects are so often lured by. Likewise, one case describes how a break in the Deep Water Horizon pipe off the coast of New Orleans was transformed through network assemblages into profits on the trading floor. In what follows I will characterize the landscape genres described above in more detail.

### Landscape Noir

Roman Polanski’s 1974 *China Town* was an early and excellent articulation of the noir landscape of Los Angeles and the provisioning of water to the city in its early days.<sup>④</sup> In noir, actors motives are always hidden, even to themselves. The act of knowing through investigation (transcribed into our professional vocabulary as “site analysis”) does not expose a constellation of facts with which we could then mobilize some design decision. Instead, knowing only ever reveals darker clandestine forces where everyone — especially the most well-meaning, plays a hand in a cheating game of self-interest. In noir, politics is only the manipulation of capital for particular interests. Civil society is

a vaporous wish image. Death and sacrifice form the other side of accumulation in the dyad that structures this world. Those who die are those that attempt to understand the real networks of actors that make decisions that matter. This is why noir is the “other side” of the Enlightenment: real knowledge of the world can only be met with death. Sacrificed are those in the way of the forces of accumulation (peasants, resistant farmers, and service workers), or unsuspecting witness / bystanders, or evidence (defectors who know what is really going on).

### Dark Comedy of Errors

In these genres, landscape architects appear as naively optimistic. They often pine for more authority than they have because they so often believe they could better manage the world than those who already do. Discussing this optimism in serious and meaningful ways is often difficult as it rests so much on the shaky legitimacy of the discipline which has long attempted to establish itself as a legitimate intellectual enterprise. This deep-seated insecurity also makes it difficult to raise the problem of how our best laid plans and optimistic decisions don’t pan out but become accomplices to more sinister realities.

The Dark Comedy of Errors is a genre in which landscapes are tragically out of control. The landscape architect and other designers are the one’s who wish to correct

their direction, function and value but their intentions enter a world that twists them, redirects and redeploys them against all of their initial intentions. This is a world of misidentified actors and causes, two faced and shape-shifting. However, it’s not only designers who play the fools but also governments, NGO’s, even the military. It is a world where control begets unpredictability. Where intentions are curled and folded back on themselves. And it hurts to laugh at it. Of course, these landscapes appear in many different forms, with many different actors, human and non-human associated with them. Never the less, failure is its most predominant motif and optimism its engine.

Both of these genres fall short of the solution oriented optimism of the discipline. Perhaps, this is why they are so often ignored or overlooked. However, this does not abscond the burdens of partaking in their construction or living with them. *Contingency Plans* is an attempt to look at landscape architecture from the side, to create a refraction, not to provide solutions or point a way forward, to reestablish a stable cosmos of trustworthy stars. Rather, it is in the hopes that seeing in a new way allows us to imagine our role in producing and occupying landscapes differently. The birth of new genres brings with them both new ways of telling stories about the world but also living in it. **LAF**

### NOTES

- ① Pak Awal and Ibu Inda are pseudonyms.
- ② The town of Sidoarjo, is for the most part an extension of Surabaya, while all of Java can be considered one continuous city interpenetrated with agriculture and small scale production. It is an agropolis horizontally delimited by its coast line (where it flips to a liquid, mariopolis) and vertically by its volcanic and risk laden peaks (where it transforms into a zone of religion-political contention).
- ③ PT Lapindo Brantas is owned by three other companies: Energi Mega Persada (Indonesia and Bakrie’s company), PT Medco E&P Brantas (Indonesia, owned first by Arifin

- Panigoro then transferred to his brother Hilmi Panigoro who was also a player in the PDI-P the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle) and Santos (Australia). Their major loan providers were Credit Suisse, Barclays, Merrill Lynch, Natixis and Fortis, among thirty three others.
- ④ Roman Polanski, *China Town* produced by Paramount Pictures, 1974. See also, the classic treatment of the development of noir literature and film and its relationship to Los Angeles history, Mike Davis, *City of Quartz* (New York: Verso Books, 1990).

### REFERENCES

- [1] Schiller, J., Lucas, A., Sulistiyanto, P. (April 2008). Learning from the East Java Mudflow: Disaster Politics in Indonesia. *Indonesia* 85, 51-77.
- [2] Friends of the Earth. (June, 2007). Lapindo Brantas and the Mud Volcano Sidoarjo, Indonesia. Retrieved from www.foeurope.org.
- [3] Friends of the Earth. (June, 2007). The Financing of the Three Brantas PSC Companies. Retrieved from www.foeurope.org.
- [4] Proctor, R. N., Schiebinger, L. (eds.) (2008). *Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.