

## 景观伦理

## The Ethics of Landscape

## 摘要 ……

本文探讨了我们应该如何对待景观所涉及的伦理内涵。文章分为3个部分，从时间和伦理角度来分析景观，得出以下结论：如果我们对自然界的支配地位不加以分析且不对这一挑战，将无法与我们居住和依存的景观形成可持续发展的关系。

这3个部分依次分析了在责任伦理、契约伦理和结果伦理影响下不同类型的景观。责任伦理通常决定了我们如何看待以某种方式纪念过去的地点，可能是我们祖先的埋葬地，又或是保护野生动物免遭人类侵害的地方；同样，契约伦理定义了我们处理当代景观的典型方法，即以财产所有权决定所有者对土地拥有可对其进行改造的处置权；最后，结果伦理通常引发我们对未来景观的思考，即我们应该如何依照预期结果评价现在的行为。

这一切使我们面临困境：无论我们看起来如何道德地操控景观，为了满足自身需求我们已破坏栖息地、导致其他物种灭绝，我们要如何为自己进行辩护？这一问题涉及道德伦理，不再强调我们对于改变景观的责任，而是应改变自身的私欲和需求。换言之，倘若我们不挑战现存的信念和价值观，将无法履行对自然界的责任。

## 关键词 ……

伦理学；责任；契约；结果；美德

## Abstract ...

This article explores the ethical implications of how we treat landscapes. It lays out a three-part, temporal and ethical analysis of landscape architecture and concludes that without an analysis of and challenge to our assumed dominance over the natural world, we will never achieve a sustainable relationship to the landscapes that we inhabit and depend upon for our survival as a species.

The three-part analysis aligns different types of landscapes with duty, contract, and consequential ethics. Duty ethics often determines how we treat places that memorialize the past in some way, whether it be where our ancestors are buried or where wildlife are protected from human intrusion. Likewise, contract ethics typically defines how we typically approach contemporary landscapes, with property rights determining who gets to manipulate the land and what activities occur there. Finally, consequentialist ethics often drives our thinking about future landscapes, how we should judge our current behavior in terms of its expected consequences.

All of this leaves us with a dilemma: however ethical we might seem in our manipulation of landscapes, how can we justify our damage of habitat and extinction of other species while we accommodate our own needs? That question leads us to virtue ethics, which puts the emphasis not on our responsibilities in altering landscapes, but instead on changing our own expectations about ourselves and our needs. In other words, we cannot fulfill our responsibility to the natural world without challenging our own beliefs and values.

## Key words ...

Ethics; Duty; Contracts; Consequences; Virtue

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我们对景观负有怎样的伦理责任？这个问题在不同的文化中有着不同的答案，但在以欧洲为中心的西方文化中，这一问题似乎尤其难以作答。长久以来，西方伦理学聚焦于人作为个体和群体对于其他人的责任，除此以外，对我们应尽的义务则很少关注。并且，由于西方认为人类和自然界存在着严格的区分，因此乍一听到“我们应对景观负有怎样的责任”这个问题时，我们会毫无头绪。<sup>[1]</sup>比如，西方伦理将互惠问题作为其核心观念，即“你愿意人怎样待你们，你们也要怎样待人”<sup>[2]</sup>。但需要铭

记的一点是，该伦理关系涉及的对象只包括那些能够理解什么是互惠关系并能够做到互利互惠的事物——宠物可能除外——而大多数动物和植物是无法做到这一点的。

这种观点在近几十年来已经有所转变。彼得·辛格等哲学家提出，由于所有的动物都具有“感知力”——它们能感觉到疼痛，因此它们会经受痛苦；而作为具有感知力的生物的人类，我们应该具有像对待其他同类一样尽可能减轻动物的疼痛与痛苦的伦理责任。<sup>[3]</sup>从这一层面而言，正是由于我们对

What ethical responsibility do we have to the landscape? Various cultures would answer that question differently, but in a Western, Eurocentric culture, that question seems particularly difficult to answer. Western ethics has long focused on the responsibilities that people have to each other as individuals and groups, with little attention to our obligations beyond that. And because the West has also maintained a sharp division between the human and natural world, the very question of what we owe the landscape sounds, at first, hard to fathom.<sup>[1]</sup> A core concept of Western ethics, for example, revolves around the issue of reciprocity, of doing to others as you would want them to do to you.<sup>[2]</sup> While a useful principle to keep in mind, it assumes that ethics encompasses only those able to understand such a principle and to reciprocate, something that, with the possible exception of pets, most of the animal and plant world cannot do.

This has begun to change in recent decades. Philosophers such as Peter Singer have argued that because all animals have “sentience” — the ability to feel pain and thus to suffer, we — as sentient beings ourselves — have as much of an ethical responsibility to reduce the pain and suffering of other animals as we do of other people.<sup>[3]</sup> Singer’s argument gets us partway to a question of our ethical responsibility to the landscape, since damage to ecosystems and animal habitat causes the sentient beings that live there to suffer. But the landscape per se figures only indirectly, as a support for animal life, in Singer’s ethics and in that sense, his thought still reflects the dominant Western idea that the non-sentient world of plants and natural resources generally exist to serve the needs of sentient beings.

That idea has led Western ethics to largely embrace our responsibilities to the landscape in terms of how it serves the needs of humans. Most of the legal systems in Western countries, for example, recognize private property rights as a foundational principle and uphold the entitlement of property owners to do what they want with the land that they own within certain constraints, such as zoning or environmental laws, that protect the rights or safety of other people.<sup>[4]</sup> While some environmental laws also protect other animal species or certain types of ecosystems, these regulations still exist within an ethical framework that privileges human

interests over those of non-humans.

Within that framework, however, there exists at least three different approaches to the protection of — and indirectly, our ethical responsibilities to — the landscape in Western culture. These three approaches differ in terms of the timeframe within which they look at our relationship to the landscape, with one focused mainly on the past, another on the present, and a third on the future. And each of these three approaches aligns with a different type of ethics: duty ethics, contract ethics, and utilitarian ethics. I hope to show on the following pages that, first, Western ethics has long had a sense of human responsibility toward the landscape and that, second, these three approaches have proven inadequate in protecting the landscape, necessitating a fourth approach that I will discuss at the conclusion of this essay.

### The Dutiful Landscape

In Western cultures, and indeed in most cultures around the world, the landscapes that people seem most attracted to and that we attend to with the greatest care involve places related to our ancestors or to our past. Such landscapes can range dramatically in type. On one extreme, there exists cemeteries where we bury and memorialize the dead. These landscapes typically remain cleared of their native habitat, as if we do not want many non-human “sentient beings” among the non-sentient human remains interred in such places. Cemeteries stand, instead, as idealized landscapes, carefully planted, tended, and maintained at great cost in terms of money and resources to remind us of the open ground and occasional tree cover that characterized the African savannas in which we evolved as a species and from which we have spread across the globe.<sup>[5]</sup> In cemeteries, at least in the West, we return our bodies to places that remind us of where the human genome began.

At the other extreme, we set aside wilderness areas, forest preserves, and “national parks” in which the natural world, at least as we define it, can flourish without much interference on the part of people. These places, mostly cleared of human habitat, reflect the sense of responsibility most governments now have toward at least small parts of the landscape and the sense of

生态系统和动物栖息地的破坏，侵害了那些栖居于此的具有感知力的生物，所以依照辛格的观点，我们应对景观——因为景观是动物生存的载体——负有伦理责任。虽然这种对景观的侵害仅是间接的，但从这个意义上讲，辛格的伦理学观点仍代表了西方的主流思想，即认为植物和自然资源这些没有感知力的事物主要是为了满足有感知力的生物的需求而存在的。

这种观点导致西方伦理学在很大程度上认同我们对景观负有责任，是因为其服务于人类的需求。例如，多数西方国家的法律体系都将私有财产权视为一项基本权利，这赋予了财产所有人在一定的限制范围内——诸如为了保护其他人的权利或安全而制定的区划法规及环境法规等<sup>[4]</sup>——对其所拥有的土地享有任意处置的权利。尽管一些环境法规还对其他动物物种或某些生态环境予以了保护，但这些法规建立的基础仍是人类的权益凌驾于非人类物种之上这一伦理框架。

在该框架内，西方文化中至少存在着三种不同的景观保护方式，这些方式也间接体现为我们所负有的伦理责任。这三种方式的不同之处在于看待我们与景观关系的时间点的不同：一种主要聚焦于过去，一种着眼于现在，而第三种关注于未来。这三种方式的背后都具有各自的伦理思想：责任伦理、契约伦理，以及功利伦理。我将在下文中对以下观点进行阐述：首先，西方伦理学中就人类对景观负有责任的观念由来已久；其次，这三种方式在保护景观方面均有所不足；因此，在文本的结尾部分对第四种方式的讨论就显得尤为必要。

### 责任景观

在西方乃至全球大多数文化中，最吸引人的，也是人们最乐于关注的就是那些与我们的祖先或是历史有关的场所。此类景观包罗万象，其中一个极端的例子就是我们埋葬和悼念逝者的墓地。这些墓地通常都与其所处的自然环境相隔绝，仿佛我们不愿让那些具有感知力的非人类生物出没在不再具有感知力的人类遗骸的周围。相反，墓地作为理想化的景观，通常需要人们花费大量资金和资源对其进行悉心栽植、照料及养护，使之保有开阔的场地以及零星的树荫——这使我们联想起典型的非洲草原景观，那里是人类这一遍布全球繁衍生息的物种的起源之地。<sup>[5]</sup>至少在西方世界中，墓地在这个意义上使我们实现了“叶落归根”。

而在另一个极端，我们在自然界——至少我们是这么定义的——中划出一个个自然保护区、森林保护区和“国家公园”，这些区域可以在不受人类干预的情况下繁茂生长。它们大多隔绝于人类生活环境，是现今多数政府至少还对小部分景观有所负责的体现，并反映出了大多数人对于这个自从人类出现并主宰地球以来便失去了其本来面貌的世界的失落感。一些学者，如环境史学家威廉·克洛宁就对此进行了批判，他认为划定自然保护区的行为是人类用以减轻在其他地区陆续造成环境破坏的罪恶感的“安慰剂”。<sup>[6]</sup>但是，自然保护区仍在一定程度上反映出了我们对自然的伦理责任，以及我们在不侵犯私有财产权的前提下，开辟出部分可供人人享用的景观的渴望。

当谈及人类对于那些埋葬着我们祖先，或是遗留着我们人类这一物种记忆的景观的关注时，就不得不提到伊曼努尔·康德的责任伦理学。<sup>[7]</sup><sup>①</sup>康德认为，我们应该不计个人后果地去做那些我们认为正当的事情。他还认为，在面临某一情况之时，我们完全知道何种做法是正当的，哪怕我们并不一定会照此行动。康德将这一问题归结为其所谓的“绝对命令”<sup>②</sup>，即我们将对他人的善行视为一种目的，而不是用来达到我们自身目的的一种手段；或仿佛我们所做的一切都是在遵循自然法则一般。康德认为“绝对命令”只能应用于我们与其他人类之间的关系，但就其表面价值而言，他的伦理学观点可同样应用于我们与自然界的关系中。我们可以将康德的观点理解为我们有责任像对待其他人类一样对待其他物种，要将其视作一种目的而非手段，并且应不计个人得失地时刻遵循自然规律行事。

康德同时认为，伦理学和美学之间的联系关乎我们如何看待这些承载着人类历史记忆的景观。他认为就像我们需要以无利害的、无私的方式去正当行事一样，我们也可以以同样的方式去欣赏优美或崇高的地方，我们不能以拥有者或掌控者的心态来看待它们，而是要怀有与他人共享之情。比如，我们与其他人类分享着对于人类的起源地——非洲热带草原的喜爱，分享着对于荒野这一人类在其中度过了我们作为一个物种繁衍的绝大部分岁月的地方的迷恋；也正因如此，我们对这些景观场所给予关爱，并乐于为其承担责任。如康德所言，我们面临的挑战是如何使这种义务感不仅体现在对像非洲草原那种远离我们生活环境的景观的关爱之上，还要使我们对这个星球产生义务感——我们尚有许多未

<sup>①</sup> 康德指出，责任这个概念是善良意志的体现，道德行为不能出于利害，只能出于责任。康德的责任伦理学将责任视为一切道德价值的源泉。

<sup>②</sup> 绝对命令，又译定言命令，是康德道德哲学中核心的哲学观念，它被用来评价行为动机的方式。康德认为，道德完全先天地存在于人的理性之中，并可以归纳为某种戒律或命令，来支配所有的责任和义务。绝对命令只考察人的动机纯正与否，而不问及结果。

loss most people have toward the world as we found it before our species became so dominant and ever-present on the planet. Some, such as the environmental historian William Cronin, have criticized the setting aside of wilderness areas as a way of assuaging our guilt for the environmental damage we continue to do everywhere else.<sup>[6]</sup> Still, wilderness areas do represent some sense of our ethical duty to nature and a desire to carve out some part of the landscape available to everyone and not beholden to private property rights.

The care with which we tend to these landscapes holding the remains of our ancestors or the memory of our species recalls the duty ethics most often associated with Immanuel Kant.<sup>[7]</sup><sup>①</sup> Kant argued that we should do what we know to be right, regardless of the consequences to us personally. He also argued that we all know what is the right thing to do in a situation, even if we do not act on that knowledge, because of what he called “categorical imperatives”<sup>②</sup> such as treating others as ends in themselves and not as means to our ends or acting as if everything we did were to hold as universal laws of nature. Kant saw those categorical imperatives applying only to other human beings, however, taken at face value, his ethics applies equally to our relationship with the natural world. We can take Kant’s argument to mean that we have a duty to treat other species as much as other people as ends and not means, and to act with the laws of nature always in mind, regardless of the consequences this might have for us personally in terms of lost wealth or power.

Kant also saw a connection between ethics and aesthetics that relates to how we see these landscapes that memorialize our past. He argued that just as we need to do what is right in a disinterested or unselfish ways, we also appreciate beautiful or sublime places in the same way, not as something we own or possess, but as something we share with others. We share with other humans, for example, a liking of the savanna landscape from which we all evolved and a fascination with the wildernesses in which we spent most of our history as a species, and because of that, we care for these places and willingly take that on as our duty. The challenge comes, as Cronin argues, in applying that same sense of obligation not just to isolated bits of landscape, but to

the entire planet, something we have yet failed to do, in part, because of the following approach to the landscape and to ethics.

### The Contractual Landscape

The primary way we take responsibility for the landscapes that we daily inhabit involves dividing them up into either public or private ownership, available for our use within legal frameworks and regulatory constraints. This conversation of the landscape into property may work for modern societies, but it has increasingly not worked for other species and for ecosystems as a whole. For example, most development of the landscape for human occupation involves the destruction of the habitat for other species, as if we cannot inhabit a piece of land without first evicting others already living there. After clearing a site of its native habitat, we then often replant the property with flora in combinations and compositions that we find aesthetically pleasing, as if wanting the natural world to approximate as much as possible an artificial one.

Landscape architecture as a term and as a discipline captures this idea perfectly. Humans have become so dominant as a species that, as the environmentalist Bill McKibben has argued, we have come to the “end of nature,” where no part of the planet remains untouched or unaffected by our actions.<sup>[8]</sup> In that light, the earth has become a design problem, something that we have control over and responsibility for and something that we need to steward and maintain as carefully as we do the architecture we inhabit. Too few people understand or appreciate the important work that landscape architects do. But in the broadest sense of term, everybody has become an “architect” of the landscape, given the pervasive impact we all now have, through the multiplying effect of technology, on the planet.

How we handle that responsibility depends upon how we see the “state of nature”<sup>③</sup> embedded in contract ethics. One of the first contract ethicists, Thomas Hobbes, argued that human life in the state of nature was “nasty, brutish, and short”, and that humans, living in constant conflict, entered into a “social contract”, trading some degree of personal freedom for the peace and security of obeying the rules and regulations of

① Kant saw the responsibility as a reflection of being good, and believed that the moral behavior can only be seen as a result of performing one’s responsibility, rather than a consequence driven by interests. Kant’s Duty Ethics saw the responsibility as the basis of moral values.

② Categorical Imperative is the central philosophical concept in Kant’s moral philosophy. It is defined as a way to evaluate the motivation of actions. Kant stated that morality inherently exists in human’s rationality, and can be summed up into a certain commandment or imperative to dominate all the responsibilities and obligations. Categorical Imperative is only used to examine the motivations of human’s behaviors as opposed to judge the consequences.

③ The time-period before the establishment of government is defined as “State of Nature” by political philosophers, in which people alienated their own natural rights, on a community voluntary basis, in a contractual way to establish a political ruling right, and entered into a state of nation.

做之事——这在某种程度上取决于接下来的我们对待景观与伦理的方式。

### 契约景观

我们对于生活环境中的景观所承担的责任主要体现在对其进行或公或私的所有权划分，从而令我们能够在法律框架下和法规的限制内根据我们的需求进行使用。这种将景观纳入财产范围的保护方式或许适用于现代社会，但对于非人类物种和整个生态系统而言，已渐渐不再具有适用意义。比如，大部分人类对于景观进行的占用性开发都涉及到对其他物种栖息地的破坏，似乎掠夺他地，并将其上原有栖居物种赶尽杀绝成为了人类栖居的唯一途径。当清除场地中的原始自然栖息地之后，我们通常会在这份景观财产中成组成群地重新种植那些我们认为赏心悦目的植物，仿佛希望对自然世界中的每一寸土地都能尽可能地进行人工雕琢。

作为一个术语以及一门学科的“景观设计”（Landscape Architecture）很好地契合了这样的思想。人类已经成为了如此强大的优势物种，如环境学家比尔·麦克吉本所言，我们已经走到了“自然的尽头”，地球上已没有未受人类活动触及或影响的地方。<sup>[8]</sup>如此看来，地球已经成为了一个设计问题——需要我们对它加以控制、承担责任，需要我们像对待我们所居住的建筑那样对其进行细致的管理和维护。而能理解或欣赏景观设计师工作的人却寥寥无几。但是，从广义上讲，每个人都是景观的“设计师”，因为随着技术效应呈几何级数扩张，人类对地球的影响已无处不在。

我们如何应对这份责任取决于我们对深藏在契约伦理背后的“自然状态”<sup>③</sup>有着怎样的解读。作为早期契约伦理学家之一，托马斯·霍布斯认为，在自然状态下的人类生活是“艰苦、野蛮而匮乏的”，人类在历经不断的冲突与抗争后，形成了“社会契约”，以牺牲一定程度的个人自由来换取遵守政府的规章制度所带来的和平与安定。<sup>[9]</sup>持有相反观点的让·雅克·卢梭则认为，自然状态下的生活是和平而充裕的，在我们开始将自然环境分割为私有财产、经历了社会腐化的影响之后，人类冲突才开始涌现。<sup>[10]</sup>

从那时起，这两种对立的观点影响了西方世界看待自然界的方式。浪漫主义者在卢梭思想的影响下，将自然视为世外避风港，希望景观尽可能呈现“自然”的面貌；而受到霍布斯影响的现实主义者

则认为应该掌控自然，并希望景观尽可能地体现人类理性与社会秩序。我们可以察觉到这两种形式的契约伦理给我们的政治和经济带来的紧张关系，体现为大政府、中央控制经济的支持者与小政府、自由经济的支持者之间的公然对抗。我们也能够察觉到这种紧张关系也存在于我们对待土地的方式中，体现在为浪漫主义景观的人工的自然与理性主义景观的几何秩序相对立，并与场地中的原生生态系统和自然化的栖息环境相对立。这些矛盾的解决方法引出了我们对待景观与伦理的第三种方式。

### 结果景观

我们周围的景观经常带给我们一种假象，会让我们觉得它们发展和演替得如此之慢，以至于我们可以期待它们能在我们有生之年基本保持原样。但是我们渐渐明白，自然并不总是保持不变，当条件达到临界点时，自然界可能会发生骤变，有时甚至是猛烈的剧变，正如我们开始认同一些极端天气现象——很多科学家将其归咎于气候变化。气候变化不仅会使我们居住地的景观发生剧变，而且还要求我们改变看待我们自身与非人类世界关系的方式以及应担负的责任。当我们意识到更大范围内的自然环境正承受着巨大的压力，诸如地球上半数以上的物种可能在未来几十年消失殆尽，我们便不能再满足于划分出几片自然区域，或者说说服自己相信所有者拥有随心所欲对其财产进行使用的契约权利。<sup>[11]</sup>这对于人类而言尤为可怕，因为相较于地球上的其他动物，我们需要大量的其他物种来满足我们的需求；我们人类正是诱发地球“第六次灭绝”的罪魁祸首。

尽管人类是这次大灭绝的元凶，但只要我们幡然醒悟，改变我们的行为，人类仍具有扭转该局势的能力。换言之，应该将目前的行为置于未来的影响中进行考虑，正如世界环境与发展委员会所言，需要“在不危及后代满足其需求的发展能力的前提下，来进行满足当代人需求的发展”<sup>[12]</sup>。这听起来公平合理；然而，要了解后代的未来需求，并判断哪些事会损害他们满足自身需求的能力却很难。部分原因在于人口以前所未有的速度持续增长，而我们围绕如何构建美好生活的预期也急速扩大。即便我们能够对上述问题有所预知，又如何能够做到既满足我们自身的需求，又不损害后代的利益？又有怎样的动机能促使我们这样做？

实用主义或功利主义伦理学可以帮我们解决这

<sup>③</sup> “自然状态”下人们基于彼此的合意，以契约的形式把原本属于自己的自然权利让渡出来形成政治统治权利，从而进入国家状态。

governments.<sup>[9]</sup> The contrary position, argued by Jean Jacques Rousseau, saw life in the state of nature as peaceful and bountiful, and that conflict arose only after we started to divide up the natural environment into private property and after we experienced the corrupting influence of society.<sup>[10]</sup>

These two positions have guided the West's treatment of the natural world ever since. Romantics, in the tradition of Rousseau, see nature as a refuge from society and want the landscape to seem as "natural" as possible, while realists, in the shadow of Hobbes, see nature as something to control and want the landscape to reflect human rationality and social order as much as possible. We see the tension between these two forms of contract ethics in our politics and economics, with the proponents of big government and central control of the economy faced off against the advocates for small government and laissez-faire economics. And we see the same tension in how we treat the land, with the artificial naturalism of the romantic landscape and the geometric orderliness of the rational landscape at odds with each other and at odds with the native ecosystems and natural habitat of a place. The resolution of those conflict stakes us to a third approach to the landscape and to ethics.

### The Consequential Landscape

The landscapes around us often lull us into thinking that they endure and evolve so slowly that we can expect them to remain largely unchanged in our lifetime. But it has begun to dawn on us all that nature does not always work that way and that when conditions reach a certain tipping point, the natural world can change suddenly and sometimes violently, as we have started to see with the extreme weather events that many scientists attribute to climate change. Climate change will not only alter the landscapes we occupy in dramatic ways, but also demand that we alter the way in which we see our relationship to and responsibility for the non-human world. We can no longer content ourselves by setting aside a few natural areas nor convince ourselves that owners have the contractual right to use their property however they see fit as we watch the larger natural environment becomes so stressed that an estimated half of all the species on the planet now face extinction over

just the next several decades.<sup>[11]</sup> This seems particularly dire for the human species because we depend on so many other species to meet our needs — more than any other animal on the planet — even as we remain the primary cause of this so-called "sixth extinction" on the planet.

Yet, as the cause of this extinction, humanity also has the capacity to reverse it if we change our behavior quickly and dramatically enough. Present actions, in other words, need to happen in the context of future consequences, requiring, as the World Commission on Environment and Development has said, "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."<sup>[12]</sup> That seems fair enough, although knowing what future generations will need and deciding on what might compromise their ability to meet those needs has proven hard to determine, in part because the human population continues to grow at an unprecedented pace and our expectations around what constitutes a good life continues to expand just as rapidly. How can we meet our needs and not compromise those of future generations and what incentive exists for us to do so, even if we knew?

Pragmatic or utilitarian ethics can help sort out such questions. Pragmatism, as the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce defined it, holds that the "the sum of (its practical) consequences constitute the entire meaning" of an idea or action. That suggests that we never fully know something until after we have had a chance to judge the effects it has had.<sup>[13]</sup> In terms of the natural environment, pragmatism means that we should act with great restraint and in incremental and experimental ways so that we — or more likely future generations — can assess its consequences before continuing. This runs counter to the popular idea of pragmatism as equivalent to practicality. The real meaning of pragmatism, the sum of its consequences, suggests that the only true practicality arises from considering the long-term effects of what we do on everyone and everything — other people, future generations, and diverse species.

Utilitarianism goes in a slightly different direction. First promulgated by Jeremy Bentham, utilitarian ethics takes a quantitative and hedonistic view of doing the

个问题。哲学家查尔斯·桑德尔·皮尔士将实用主义定义为一种想法或行动，即“（其实践）结果的总和才具有整体意义”。这表明，在我们能对某个事物所造成的影响做出评判之前，我们无法对其完全了解。<sup>[13]</sup>就自然环境而言，实用主义意味着我们应极其克制地，并用渐进的、探索的方式来行事，以使我们——或更有可能是后代人——能够在继续行事之前对结果进行前行评估。这与实用主义等同于实际性的普遍观点背道而驰。实用主义的真正含义——即其结果的总和——告诉我们，真正的实用性源自我们对所有人、事、物——即我们对其他人、后代和不同物种的长期影响的考虑。

功利主义与实用主义略有不同。其最早由杰里米·边沁提出，认为要对行正当之事持量化和享乐观点，即我们应尽可能最大限度地追求愉悦，并尽可能最小限度地承受痛苦。<sup>[14]</sup>后来的思想家，如约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒，对边沁的“享乐微积分”进行了限定，认为一些快乐——如友谊及个人成就——比肉体上的快乐更具价值。而其他人，如前文所提到的辛格，对边沁的“微积分”进行了拓展，即将获得最大程度利益的主体从人类扩展为所有动物。<sup>[15]</sup>但是，这些各类的功利主义伦理学都面临着同样的问题：我们如何对最大程度的利益进行衡量？我们如何知道现在采取哪些行动会在今后带来最大程度的利益？快乐——或以谋求快乐而做的事情——是否是衡量我们为了确保自己和他人在这地球上拥有更加美好的未来所做之事的价值的唯一或最佳方式？

### 美德景观

在我们围绕对待景观的几种伦理方式进行了简要梳理后，我们已经发现了上述三种方式的局限性。从一个极端（墓地）到另一个极端（自然保护区）中可以看出，责任伦理能够较好地适用于理想化景观，但它很难帮助我们处理日常居住环境中的现实景观。接下来，契约伦理能够极好地解决我们当前将景观划分为公共和私有财产的问题，但是它与随时可能改变我们生活环境中的景观的未来的气候变化相违背——甚至是推波助澜。再接下来，实用主义和功利主义伦理学为评估我们的行为对景观和自然界这个整体的健康情况所产生的影响提供了方法。但是这一伦理立场受到了现实条件的制约，因为我们永远不可能知道我们将对后代，或尚处于演变中的生态系统造成的所有影响。

考虑到这些局限性，我们的前路在何方？关于如何看待景观和伦理的第四种方式给出了答案。在很多方面，它是在包含其他三种方式的基础之上，以新旧结合的方法对其进行拓展。这是对待景观的一种美德伦理方式。至少在西方，美德伦理在我们那些对于他人责任的方式的最古老的思考中便已经出现。其依据的观点是：我们需要改变我们自身，而不是去，或至少不先去改变我们所处的世界。这一古老的观念或许反映出了人类环境现实，即人类在作为一个物种的大部分历史进程中，无法对周遭的景观做出任何重大改变，所以我们便从适应与顺从的角度出发，提出了一种强调公平、勇敢、审慎与节制等美德的伦理。在驯化非人类本性前先驯化人类本性，才是明智之举。

当科技力量足以使人们能够更加快速有效地改变周遭世界时，美德伦理便淡出了人们的视线。现代伦理学更多地关注我们的行为而非个人品德，强调我们要行正当之事而非以正当的方式去行事。这也与我们对待景观的态度相一致，我们不再去适应自然界，而是根据我们的意愿和本着为了给我们自身带来便利的目的对其进行塑造。当人类从支配和掌控自然中获得了更多的愉悦时，那些人类赖以生存的资源——清洁的水源、洁净的空气、健康的生态系统——也开始迅速受到侵害，并威胁着我们的生存。

半个世纪之前，美德伦理已开始回潮。正如哲学家重新把有道德的行为视作美好生活的基石大加赞赏。<sup>[16]</sup>我们也需要用同样的态度去看待我们与自然界的关联，以及我们对周边景观所担负的责任。我们需要重新学习如何去适应自然，并调整对自然的期许。我们不要将自然视为我们的所有物而随心所欲地使用。为什么要这样做？因为态势迫在眉睫，如果我们不主动做出改变，气候也会迫使我们这样去做。LAF

right thing: we should strive to maximize pleasure and minimize suffering for the greatest number.<sup>[14]</sup> Subsequent thinkers like John Stuart Mill qualified Bentham's "hedonistic calculus," by arguing that some pleasures — like friendship and personal accomplish — have a higher value than the carnal variety, and others, like Peter Singer, as already mentioned, have expanded Bentham's calculus to include the greatest good of all animals, not just humans.<sup>[15]</sup> But all of these varieties of utilitarian ethics confront the same question: how can we measure the greatest good and how do we know which action we take now will maximize the good in the future? And does pleasure — or practicality for that matter — offer the only way or even the best way of measuring the value of what we do now in order to ensure a better future for ourselves and others on this planet?

### The Virtuous Landscape

In our brief survey of some of the ethics surrounding our treatment of the landscape, we have seen some of the limitations of these three approaches. Duty ethics seems well suited to idealized landscapes, from cemeteries at one extreme to wilderness areas at another, but it offers little help in dealing with the actual landscapes that we inhabit every day. Contract ethics, in turn, appears perfectly adept at addressing the way in which we currently divide up the landscape into public and private property, but it runs counter to — and indeed may have helped cause — the climate change that will invariably alter the future landscapes in which we live. Pragmatism and utilitarian ethics, in turn, offer a way of assessing the effects of our actions on the health of landscapes and of the natural world as a whole, but that ethical stance confronts the real limitation that we can never know the full consequences of what we do on future generations or not-yet-evolved ecosystems.

Given those limitations, how should we move forward? One answer lies in a fourth approach to the landscape and to ethics that, in many ways, encompasses the other three and expands upon them in new and old ways. Call this a virtuous approach to the landscape. Virtue ethics remains, at least in the West, among the oldest ways of thinking about our responsibilities to

others, and it rests on the idea that we need to change ourselves rather than or at least prior to changing the world around us. This ancient idea probably reflected the reality of the human condition for most of our history as a species, in which we lacked the means to alter the landscapes around us to any great degree and so we developed an ethics around the idea of adaptation, with a focus on virtues such as justice, courage, prudence, and temperance. Taming human nature wisely took precedence over taming non-human nature.

Virtue ethics fell out of favor in much of the modern era as our technological prowess enabled us to alter the world around us with increasing speed and efficiency. Modern ethics has focused much more on our actions rather than our personal virtues, addressing the right things to do rather than the right way to be. This parallels our treatment of the landscape, in which we have gone from adapting to the natural world as we find it to shaping it according to our will and for our convenience. While that command and control of nature has certainly made human life more pleasant, it has also led to the point where the resources upon which the human species has always depended — clean water, clean air, healthy ecosystems — have begun to erode at such a rate that it threatens our very existence.

Virtue ethics has made a comeback over the last half century or so, as philosophers have regained an appreciation of virtuous behavior as the basis for living a good life.<sup>[16]</sup> We need to do the same with how we relate to the natural world and take responsibility for the landscapes around us. Rather than see nature as ours to use as we see fit, we need to relearn how to adapt to it and readjust our expectations of it. And why do this? Because, given current trends, the climate will force us to do so if we do not do it first ourselves. **LAF**

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