%A Lin-Mei Liang(梁林海), Shi-Hai Sun(孙仕海), Mu-Sheng Jiang(江木生), Chun-Yan Li(李春燕) %T Security analysis on some experimental quantum key distribution systems with imperfect optical and electrical devices %0 Journal Article %D 2014 %J Front. Phys. %J Frontiers of Physics %@ 2095-0462 %R 10.1007/s11467-014-0420-6 %P 613-628 %V 9 %N 5 %U {https://journal.hep.com.cn/fop/EN/10.1007/s11467-014-0420-6 %8 2014-10-15 %X

In general, quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved unconditionally secure for perfect devices due to quantum uncertainty principle, quantum noncloning theorem and quantum nondividing principle which means that a quantum cannot be divided further. However, the practical optical and electrical devices used in the system are imperfect, which can be exploited by the eavesdropper to partially or totally spy the secret key between the legitimate parties. In this article, we first briefly review the recent work on quantum hacking on some experimental QKD systems with respect to imperfect devices carried out internationally, then we will present our recent hacking works in details, including passive faraday mirror attack, partially random phase attack, wavelength-selected photon-number-splitting attack, frequency shift attack, and single-photon-detector attack. Those quantum attack reminds people to improve the security existed in practical QKD systems due to imperfect devices by simply adding countermeasure or adopting a totally different protocol such as measurement-device independent protocol to avoid quantum hacking on the imperfection of measurement devices [Lo, et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 2012, 108: 130503].