



## Supplementary materials for

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### 1 Supplement to notations and formula definitions

#### 1.1 Notations

The main notations are presented as follows:  $\mathcal{CN}(\mu, \sigma^2)$  denotes the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean  $\mu$  and variance  $\sigma^2$ . For any vector  $\mathbf{v}$ ,  $v_i$  denotes the  $i^{\text{th}}$  element,  $\|\mathbf{v}\|$  denotes the Euclidean norm, and  $\text{diag}(\mathbf{v})$  denotes the diagonal operation. For any matrix  $\mathbf{V}$ ,  $V_{i,j}$  is the  $i^{\text{th}}$  row and  $j^{\text{th}}$  column element, and the transpose and conjugate transpose are  $\mathbf{V}^T$  and  $\mathbf{V}^H$ , respectively.  $|x|$  denotes the absolute value of  $x$ , and  $\text{Re}\{x\}$  is its real part.  $\otimes$  denotes the Kronecker product.

#### 1.2 Formula definitions in Sections 3.1 and 3.2

$\mathbf{A}_U$ ,  $\mathbf{A}_E$ , and  $c_{U1}$  in Section 3.1 are defined as Eq. (S1):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A}_U &= \left( \boldsymbol{\theta}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} + \mathbf{h}_{SU}^H \right)^H \left( \boldsymbol{\theta}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} + \mathbf{h}_{SU}^H \right), \\ \mathbf{A}_E &= \left( \boldsymbol{\theta}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} + \mathbf{h}_{SE}^H \right)^H \left( \boldsymbol{\theta}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} + \mathbf{h}_{SE}^H \right), \\ c_{U1} &= \left| \left( \boldsymbol{\theta}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{JR} + \mathbf{h}_{JU}^H \right) \mathbf{m} \right|^2 + \sigma_u^2. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{S1})$$

The formula manipulation in Section 3.2 can be introduced to obtain  $\mathbf{G}_{u,1}$ ,  $b_{u,1}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}_{u,2}$ ,  $b_{u,2}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}_{e,1}$ ,  $b_{e,1}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}_{e,2}$ ,  $b_{e,2}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}_j$ , and  $b_j$  as the following Eq. (S2):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{G}_{u,1} &= \begin{bmatrix} \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}) & \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{h}_{SU} \\ \mathbf{h}_{SU}^H \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}) & 0 \end{bmatrix}, b_{u,1} = \mathbf{h}_{SU}^H \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{h}_{SU}, \\ \mathbf{G}_{u,2} &= \begin{bmatrix} \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}) & \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{h}_{SU} \\ \mathbf{h}_{SU}^H \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}) & 0 \end{bmatrix}, b_{u,2} = \mathbf{h}_{SU}^H \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{h}_{SU}, \\ \mathbf{G}_{e,1} &= \begin{bmatrix} \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}) & \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{h}_{SE} \\ \mathbf{h}_{SE}^H \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}) & 0 \end{bmatrix}, b_{e,1} = \mathbf{h}_{SE}^H \mathbf{w} \mathbf{w}^H \mathbf{h}_{SE}, \\ \mathbf{G}_{e,2} &= \begin{bmatrix} \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}) & \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}^H) \mathbf{H}_{SR} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{h}_{SE} \\ \mathbf{h}_{SE}^H \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{H}_{SR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RE}) & 0 \end{bmatrix}, b_{e,2} = \mathbf{h}_{SE}^H \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}^H \mathbf{h}_{SE}, \\ \mathbf{G}_j &= \begin{bmatrix} \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{JR} \mathbf{m} \mathbf{m}^H \mathbf{H}_{JR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}) & \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}^H) \mathbf{H}_{JR} \mathbf{m} \mathbf{m}^H \mathbf{h}_{JU} \\ \mathbf{h}_{JU}^H \mathbf{m} \mathbf{m}^H \mathbf{H}_{JR}^H \text{diag}(\mathbf{h}_{RU}) & 0 \end{bmatrix}, b_j = \mathbf{h}_{JU}^H \mathbf{m} \mathbf{m}^H \mathbf{h}_{JU}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{S2})$$

Manifold optimization (MO) is divided mainly into the following three steps:

1. Computation of Riemannian gradient: With the reformulation, the Euclidean gradient of  $C_s$  can be easily obtained. We use  $\nabla f$  to represent the Euclidean gradient of  $C_s$ , which can be expressed as Eq. (S3). Then, the Riemannian gradient  $\text{grad}f$  can be expressed as Eq. (S4).

$$\nabla f = \frac{1}{\ln 2} \left( \frac{2\mathbf{G}_{u,1}\mathbf{s} + 2\mathbf{G}_{u,2}\mathbf{s} + 2\mathbf{G}_j\mathbf{s}}{\mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_{u,1} \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_{u,2} \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_j \mathbf{s} + b_j + b_{u,1} + b_{u,2} + \sigma_u^2} - \frac{2\mathbf{G}_{u,2}\mathbf{s} + 2\mathbf{G}_j\mathbf{s}}{\mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_{u,2} \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_j \mathbf{s} + b_j + b_{u,2} + \sigma_u^2} \right. \\ \left. + \frac{2\mathbf{G}_{e,2}\mathbf{s}}{\mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_{e,2} \mathbf{s} + b_{e,2} + \sigma_e^2} - \frac{2\mathbf{G}_{e,1}\mathbf{s} + 2\mathbf{G}_{e,2}\mathbf{s}}{\mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_{e,1} \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{s}^H \mathbf{G}_{e,2} \mathbf{s} + b_{e,1} + b_{e,2} + \sigma_e^2} \right). \quad (\text{S3})$$

$$\text{grad}f = \nabla f - \text{Re}\{\nabla f \circ \mathbf{s}^*\} \circ \mathbf{s}. \quad (\text{S4})$$

2. Finding search direction: The search direction  $\mathbf{d}$  is selected as the tangent vector conjugate to  $\text{grad}f$ , which can be expressed as follows:

$$\mathbf{d} = -\text{grad}f + \tau_1 T(\bar{\mathbf{d}}), \quad (\text{S5})$$

where  $\tau_1$  is the conjugate gradient update parameter,  $\bar{\mathbf{d}}$  is the previous search direction, and  $T(\mathbf{d})$  is the vector transport function given by

$$T(\mathbf{d}) = \bar{\mathbf{d}} - \text{Re}\{\mathbf{d} \circ \mathbf{s}^*\} \circ \mathbf{s}. \quad (\text{S6})$$

3. Retraction: After obtaining the optimization solution, the tangent vector should be projected back to the complex circle manifold, i.e.,

$$\mathbf{s}_n \leftarrow \frac{(\mathbf{s} + \tau_2 \mathbf{d})_n}{|(\mathbf{s} + \tau_2 \mathbf{d})_n|}, \forall n = 1, \dots, N+1, \quad (\text{S7})$$

where  $\mathbf{s}$  is the solution in the last iteration, and  $\tau_2$  is the step size updated by the Armijo rule generally.

Furthermore, we introduce  $\boldsymbol{\theta} = \frac{\mathbf{s}_{(1:N)}}{\mathbf{s}_{N+1}}$  to recover  $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ .

## 2 Supplement to convergence, complexity, and additional result analysis

### 2.1 Convergence and complexity analysis

The overall algorithm is summarized as Algorithm 1. The number of iterations for Algorithm 1 is denoted by  $t$ . Since both the successive convex approximation (SCA) based and MO-based algorithms are guaranteed to converge, the objective value satisfies the following inequality:

$$C_s(\mathbf{w}^{(n)}, \mathbf{v}^{(n)}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}^{(n)}) \leq C_s(\mathbf{w}^{(n+1)}, \mathbf{v}^{(n+1)}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}^{(n)}) \leq C_s(\mathbf{w}^{(n+1)}, \mathbf{v}^{(n+1)}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}^{(n+1)}). \quad (\text{S8})$$

The above inequality implies that the objective value sequence  $\{C_s(\mathbf{w}^{(n)}, \mathbf{v}^{(n)}, \boldsymbol{\Theta}^{(n)}), t = 1, 2, \dots\}$  increases monotonically. Since there exists an upper bound for the secrecy capacity due to the limited transmit power at the base station, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge.

The computational complexity for the MO-based algorithm is given by  $\mathcal{O}(N^2)$  (Guo HY et al., 2020), and the computational complexity for solving problem (18) is given by  $\mathcal{O}(M^3)$  (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2001).

Hence, the total computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is  $\mathcal{O}(t(N^2 + M^3))$ .

## 2.2 Additional result analysis

Fig. S1 shows the secrecy capacity versus the transmit power  $P_j$  for different baseline schemes. Set  $N_H = 100$ ,  $M = 8$ , and  $P = 40$  dBm. It can be observed that as the transmit power of the jammer increases, the secrecy capacity of all the schemes decreases. When  $P_j = 20$  dBm, the secrecy capacity of the proposed algorithm increases by 31.3% and 67.0% compared with that of the two other schemes, respectively.




Fig. S1 Secrecy capacity comparison versus transmit power  $P_j$  for different baseline schemes with  $M=8$

## References

- Ben-Tal A, Nemirovski A, 2001. Lectures on modern convex optimization: analysis, algorithms, and engineering applications. SIAM.
- Guo HY, Liang YC, Chen J, et al., 2020. Weighted sum-rate maximization for reconfigurable intelligent surface aided wireless networks. *IEEE Trans Wirel Commun*, 19(5):3064-3076.