



Novel efficient identity-based signature on lattices*

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Abstract: With the rapid development of electronic information technology, digital signature has become an indispensable part of our lives. Traditional public key certificate cryptosystems cannot overcome the limitations of certificate management. Identity-based cryptosystems can avoid the certificate management issues. The development of quantum computers has brought serious challenges to traditional cryptography. Post-quantum cryptography research is imperative. At present, almost all post-quantum identity-based signature (IBS) schemes are constructed using Gaussian sampling or trapdoor technologies. However, these two technologies have a great impact on computational efficiency. To overcome this problem, we construct an IBS scheme on lattices by employing Lyubashevsky's signature scheme. Based on the shortest vector problem on lattices, our scheme does not use Gaussian sampling or trapdoor technologies. In the random oracle model, it is proved that our scheme is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen messages and identity attacks. The security level of our scheme is strongly unforgeable, which is a higher level than the existential unforgeability of other schemes. Compared with other efficient schemes, our scheme has advantages in computation complexity and security.

Key words: Identity-based signature; Lattice; Strong unforgeability; Random oracle model

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1 Introduction

With the development of information technology, artificial intelligence is becoming ever more pervasive in almost all aspects of our lives, such as e-commerce, Internet of Things, cloud services, smart devices, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Karam et al., 2012; Al Sharif et al., 2016; Al-Sharif et al., 2016; Hamdi et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2019; Iqbal et al., 2019). However, there are different levels of security issues in these areas. The core of these secu-

urity issues is ultimately cryptographic. With the development of quantum computers, traditional cryptography has been greatly challenged and impacted. There is a lot of research on post-quantum cryptography. Lattice-based cryptography is one of the popular post-quantum cryptographies, and has attracted a lot of attention.

The identity-based signature (IBS) was first proposed by Shamir (1985). Identity-based cryptosystems are alternatives to traditional certificate-based cryptosystems. In an identity-based cryptosystem, user's private key is generated by the private key generator (PKG), and the public key is the user's public information (such as identity and email). Because public keys do not require authentication, the use of identity-based cryptosystems is becoming widespread. IBS is one of the important applications.

Since it was first proposed by Shamir (1985),

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several IBS schemes have been proposed (Fiat and Shamir, 1987; Choon and Cheon, 2002; Hess, 2003; Barreto et al., 2005; Paterson and Schuldt, 2006). They almost all work under the hardness assumptions of the algebraic number theory. With the development of quantum computers, they become insecure. There is an increasing amount of research on post-quantum cryptography to protect against quantum algorithm attacks. The aforementioned lattice system performs well against quantum algorithm attacks, and is a research hotspot.

Rückert (2010) first proposed two IBS schemes based on lattices in the random oracle model and standard model. Then, several lattice-based IBS schemes have been constructed. Gu et al. (2012) proposed an IBS scheme and an identity-based blind signature scheme based on lattices. These schemes are existentially unforgeable based on the hardness of the small integer solution (SIS) problem of lattices in the random oracle model. Liu et al. (2013) proposed an IBS scheme and a hierarchical IBS (HIBS) scheme based on the SIS problem in the standard model. Tian et al. (2013) proposed an HIBS scheme based on the SIS problem in the random oracle model. Tian and Huang (2014) presented a lattice-based IBS scheme based on the SIS problem in the random oracle model. Xie et al. (2016) proposed an IBS scheme based on number theory research unit (NTRU) lattice in the random oracle model. Among these schemes, Tian and Huang (2014)'s and Xie et al. (2016)'s schemes are relatively efficient. In addition, because of the advantages of identity-based cryptosystems, several signature schemes (Wei et al., 2014; Gao et al., 2017a, 2017b; Zhang et al., 2018a, 2018b; Zhao and Tian, 2018) with special properties have been proposed.

Lyubashevsky (2009) constructed a signature scheme based on the hardness of finding the approximate shortest vector within a factor of $\tilde{O}(n^2)$ in the random oracle model. Inspired by Lyubashevsky (2009), we construct a novel IBS scheme based on lattices. The main contributions of our scheme are as follows:

1. By employing Lyubashevsky's scheme twice, we construct an IBS scheme based on the hardness of finding the approximate shortest vector problem.
2. Our scheme does not use Gaussian sampling or trapdoor technologies, which would take up much computing resource.

3. In the random oracle model, it is proved that our scheme is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity.

Compared with other schemes, our scheme has advantages of low computation complexity and high security.

2 Preliminaries

Notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1.

Table 1 Symbol description

Notation	Description
$\mathbb{R}(\mathbb{Z})$	Set of real numbers (integers)
p	A prime such that $p = 3 \bmod 8$
n	A power of 2
m and d	Integers
\mathbb{Z}_p	Quotient ring $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$
$x^n + 1$	Irreducible polynomial
Letter with tilde, such as \tilde{a} and \tilde{Y}	Polynomial
Bold and italics lowercase letter with hat, such as $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$	Vector of polynomial
R	Ring $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]/\langle x^n + 1 \rangle$
D	Subset of R
$\ \cdot\ _\infty$	Infinity norm ℓ_∞
\mathcal{H}	Function family
H	Hash function
μ	Message

2.1 Lattices

Definition 1 (Lattice) Let $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$ be a matrix constructed by m linearly independent vectors $\{\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2, \dots, \mathbf{b}_m\}$. The lattice \mathcal{L} generated by \mathbf{B} is defined as

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B}) = \{\mathbf{B}\mathbf{x} : \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m\}.$$

Let Λ be an $(x^n + 1)$ -cyclic lattice (Micciancio, 2007) such that if any vector $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) \in \Lambda$, then the vector $(a_n, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n-1})$ also in Λ .

Definition 2 (SVP $_\gamma(\Lambda)$ problem) Given a lattice Λ and a rational number $\gamma \geq 1$, the goal of the SVP $_\gamma(\Lambda)$ problem is to find a vector \mathbf{v} such that $\|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq \gamma\lambda_1(\Lambda)$, where $\lambda_1(\Lambda)$ is the smallest ℓ_∞ norm of any vector in Λ .

2.2 Lattice-based collision-resistant hash function

Let n be any power of 2 and R be the ring $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]/\langle x^n + 1 \rangle$. Now, we review the definition of

the hash function family (Lyubashevsky, 2009).

Definition 3 (Family of hash functions) For $D \subset R$ and any integer m , $\mathcal{H}(R, D, m) = \{h_{\hat{a}} : h_{\hat{a}}(\hat{z}) = \hat{a} \cdot \hat{z}, \hat{a} \in R^m, \hat{z} \in D^m\}$ is the hash function family, where all operations are executed in the ring $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]/\langle x^n + 1 \rangle$.

Given an element $h \in \mathcal{H}(R, D, m)$, for any $\hat{y}, \hat{z} \in R^m$ and $\tilde{c} \in R$, two equations, i.e., $h(\hat{y} + \hat{z}) = h(\hat{y}) + h(\hat{z})$ and $h(\hat{y}\tilde{c}) = h(\hat{y})\tilde{c}$, hold.

Definition 4 (Collision problem $\text{Col}(h, D)$) Given $D \subset R$ and an element $h \in \mathcal{H}(R, D, m)$, the goal of $\text{Col}(h, D)$ is to find two distinct vectors $\hat{z}_1, \hat{z}_2 \in D^m$ such that $h(\hat{z}_1) = h(\hat{z}_2)$.

It was shown in Lyubashevsky and Micciancio (2006) that $\text{Col}(h, D)$ is as hard as SVP_γ for any $(x^n + 1)$ -cyclic lattice. Define $D = \{\tilde{g} \in R : \|\tilde{g}\|_\infty \leq d\}$ for integer d . $\mathcal{H}(R, D, m)$ is defined such that $m > \frac{\log p}{\log 2d}$ and $p \geq 4dmn^{1.5} \log n$. We have the following theorem:

Theorem 1 (Lyubashevsky, 2009) If there exists a polynomial time algorithm that can solve the $\text{Col}(h, D)$ problem for a random $h \in \mathcal{H}(R, D, m)$ with a non-negligible probability, then there exists a polynomial time algorithm that can solve $\text{SVP}_\gamma(\Lambda)$ for every $(x^n + 1)$ -cyclic lattice Λ , where $\gamma = 16dmn \log^2 n$.

2.3 Security model

Unforgeability against strong adversaries of the IBS scheme is defined by the following game:

Game Adversary \mathcal{A} interacts with challenger \mathcal{C} as follows:

1. Setup

\mathcal{C} runs the setup algorithm to obtain the system parameters (params), master public key (mpk), and master secret key (msk). Then, \mathcal{C} sends params and mpk to \mathcal{A} and keeps msk secret.

2. Queries

\mathcal{A} can make the following three types of queries to \mathcal{C} :

(1) Hash query

\mathcal{A} can request the hash value for any input. \mathcal{C} returns the corresponding value.

(2) Extract query

\mathcal{A} can request the private key for any identity ID. \mathcal{C} returns the private key of identity ID.

(3) Sign query

\mathcal{A} can request the signature for any input in the

form of (ID, μ) , where μ is a message. \mathcal{C} returns a valid signature corresponding to (ID, μ) .

3. Forgery

\mathcal{A} outputs a signature sig^* on the message μ^* with regard to the identity ID^* . \mathcal{A} wins the game if and only if (1) $\text{verify}(\text{params}, \text{sig}^*, \mu^*, \text{ID}^*) = 1$, (2) ID^* is never requested in extract query, and (3) (sig^*, μ^*) is not returned by sign query.

Definition 5 (Strong unforgeability) An IBS scheme is strongly unforgeable if the success probability of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible.

3 Identity-based signature scheme based on lattices

In this section, we describe the IBS scheme and analyze its correctness, security, and efficiency.

3.1 Construction

Our IBS scheme without trapdoors works as follows:

1. Setup(n)

Given a security parameter n as a power of 2, set $m = \log n$, $d = mn^{1.5} \log n$, and p as a prime larger than $4d^2$ such that $p = 3 \pmod{8}$. It is easy to verify that $m > \frac{\log p}{\log 2d}$ and $p \geq 4dmn^{1.5} \log n$ when $n > 4$. Then, these parameters define the sets of $R = \mathbb{Z}_p[x]/\langle x^n + 1 \rangle$, $D = \{\tilde{g} \in R : \|\tilde{g}\|_\infty \leq d\}$, $D_h = \{\tilde{g} \in R : \|\tilde{g}\|_\infty \leq 1\}$, $D_s = \{\tilde{g} \in R : \|\tilde{g}\|_\infty \leq n^{0.5} \log n\}$, and $D_z = \{\tilde{g} \in R : \|\tilde{g}\|_\infty \leq d - n^{0.5} \log n\}$, and the function family $\mathcal{H}(R, D, m)$. Pick a hash function h randomly from the family $\mathcal{H}(R, D, m)$. Select a random oracle hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow D_h$. Pick \hat{s}_0 randomly from D_s^m and compute $\tilde{S} = h(\hat{s}_0)$.

Output PKG's secret key $\text{msk} = \hat{s}_0$, PKG's public key $\text{mpk} = \tilde{S}$, and the public parameters $\text{params} = \{n, m, p, R, D, D_h, D_s, D_z, h, H\}$.

2. Extract(params, msk, ID)

Given params, msk, and identity $\text{ID} \in \{0, 1\}^*$, the calculation is as follows:

(1) Choose $\hat{r}_{\text{ID}} \xleftarrow{\$} D^m$ and compute $\tilde{Q}_{\text{ID}} = h(\hat{r}_{\text{ID}})$;

(2) Calculate $\tilde{e} = H(\text{ID}, \tilde{Q}_{\text{ID}})$ and $\hat{s}_{\text{ID}} = \hat{s}_0 \tilde{e} + \hat{r}_{\text{ID}}$;

(3) If $\hat{s}_{\text{ID}} \notin D_z^m$, then go to step (1);

(4) Return $(\hat{s}_{ID}, \tilde{Q}_{ID})$ to the user with identity ID, where \hat{s}_{ID} is secret and \tilde{Q}_{ID} is public.

Users can verify the correctness of the secret key $sk_{ID} = \hat{s}_{ID}$ by checking if $\hat{s}_{ID} \in D_z^m$ and $h(\hat{s}_{ID}) = \tilde{S}\tilde{e} + \tilde{Q}_{ID}$, where $\tilde{e} = H(ID, \tilde{Q}_{ID})$.

3. Sign(params, sk_{ID} , μ)

Given params, message $\mu \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and signing key sk_{ID} , the calculation is as follows:

(1) Choose $\hat{y} \xleftarrow{\$} D_s^m$ and compute $\tilde{Y} = h(\hat{y})$;
 (2) Calculate $\tilde{c} = H(\mu, \tilde{Y}, \tilde{Q}_{ID})$ and $\hat{z} = \hat{y}\tilde{c} + \hat{s}_{ID}$;

(3) If $\hat{z} \notin D_z^m$, then go to step (1);
 (4) Output the signature $sig = (\hat{z}, \tilde{Y})$.

4. Verify(params, sig, μ , ID)

Given params, signature $sig = (\hat{z}, \tilde{Y})$, message μ , and identity ID, the signature is accepted if and only if $\hat{z} \in D_z^m$ and $h(\hat{z}) = \tilde{Y}\tilde{c} + \tilde{S}\tilde{e} + \tilde{Q}_{ID}$, where $\tilde{c} = H(\mu, \tilde{Y}, \tilde{Q}_{ID})$ and $\tilde{e} = H(ID, \tilde{Q}_{ID})$.

3.2 Correctness

It is easy to verify the correctness of the signature by

$$\begin{aligned} h(\hat{z}) &= h(\hat{y}\tilde{c} + \hat{s}_{ID}) \\ &= h(\hat{y}\tilde{c} + \hat{s}_0\tilde{e} + \hat{r}_{ID}) \\ &= h(\hat{y}\tilde{c}) + h(\hat{s}_0\tilde{e}) + h(\hat{r}_{ID}) \\ &= h(\hat{y})\tilde{c} + h(\hat{s}_0)\tilde{e} + h(\hat{r}_{ID}) \\ &= \tilde{Y}\tilde{c} + \tilde{S}\tilde{e} + \tilde{Q}_{ID}. \end{aligned}$$

3.3 Security

Lemma 1 Suppose that there exists a polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} who can output a valid forgery of the proposed scheme with probability ε . By employing the power of \mathcal{A} , we can construct an algorithm \mathcal{B} that obtains a solution to $Col(h, D)$ with a probability of at least $\frac{1 - e^{-1}}{2t_H}\varepsilon$, where e is the base of natural logarithm and t_H is the maximum number of hash queries by \mathcal{A} .

Proof Assume that there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can output a valid forgery for our IBS scheme with non-negligible probability ε . Using \mathcal{A} , we construct a polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{B} that outputs a solution to $Col(h, D)$ with a non-negligible probability.

\mathcal{B} runs the setup algorithm to generate params, mpk, and msk, and sends params and mpk to adversary \mathcal{A} . Then \mathcal{B} simulates all oracles as follows:

1. Hash query

\mathcal{B} maintains initial empty list L_1 in the form of $(ID_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$ and L_2 in the form of $(\mu_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{c}_i)$. When \mathcal{A} makes a query on (ID_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}) , \mathcal{B} checks the list L_1 . If $(ID_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$ exists, \mathcal{B} returns \tilde{e}_i to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise, \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $\tilde{e}_i \in D_h$ and returns it to \mathcal{A} , and adds $(ID_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$ to L_1 . When \mathcal{A} makes query on $(\mu_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i})$, \mathcal{B} checks the list L_2 . If $(\mu_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{c}_i)$ exists, \mathcal{B} returns \tilde{c}_i to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise, \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $\tilde{c}_i \in D_h$ and returns it to \mathcal{A} , and adds $(\mu_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{c}_i)$ to L_2 .

2. Extract query

\mathcal{B} maintains an initial empty list L_3 in the form of $(ID_i, sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$. When \mathcal{A} makes query on $(ID_i, sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i})$, \mathcal{B} checks the list L_3 . If $(ID_i, sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$ exists, \mathcal{B} returns $(sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i})$ to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise, \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $\tilde{e}_i \in D_h$ and $sk_{ID_i} \in D_z^m$, computes $\tilde{Q}_{ID_i} = h(sk_{ID_i}) - mpk\tilde{e}_i$, returns $(sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i})$ to \mathcal{A} , and adds $(ID_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$ to L_1 and $(ID_i, sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$ to L_3 .

3. Sign query

\mathcal{B} maintains an initial empty list L_4 in the form of $(ID_i, \mu_i, \hat{z}_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{c}_i)$. When \mathcal{A} makes query on (ID_i, μ_i) , \mathcal{B} checks the list L_4 . If $(ID_i, \mu_i, \hat{z}_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{c}_i)$ exists, \mathcal{B} returns (\hat{z}_i, \tilde{Y}_i) to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise, \mathcal{B} checks the list L_3 . If $(ID_i, sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{e}_i)$ does not exist, \mathcal{B} makes query on $(ID_i, sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i})$ by itself. \mathcal{B} obtains the secret key $(sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i})$ of identity ID_i . Then, \mathcal{B} randomly selects $\hat{y}_i \in D_s^m$ and $\tilde{c}_i \in D_h$, sets $\tilde{Y}_i = h(\hat{y}_i)$ and $\hat{z}_i = \hat{y}_i\tilde{c}_i + sk_{ID_i}$, returns $(\mu_i, \hat{z}_i, \tilde{Y}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and adds $(\mu_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i}, \tilde{c}_i)$ to L_2 and $(ID_i, \mu_i, \hat{z}_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \tilde{c}_i)$ to L_4 .

Forgery \mathcal{A} outputs a valid forgery $(\mu^*, \hat{z}_1^*, \tilde{Y}^*, \tilde{Q}_{ID}^*, \tilde{e}_1^*, \tilde{c}^*)$ about identity ID^* with non-negligible probability ε , where $(ID_i, sk_{ID_i}, \tilde{Q}_{ID_i})$ is never requested in extract query and $(\mu^*, \hat{z}_1^*, \tilde{Y}^*)$ is not returned by sign query. According to the forking lemma in Pointcheval and Stern (2000), \mathcal{A} can output two valid forgeries $(\mu^*, \hat{z}_1^*, \tilde{Y}^*, \tilde{Q}_{ID}^*, \tilde{e}_1^*, \tilde{c}^*)$ and $(\mu^*, \hat{z}_2^*, \tilde{Y}^*, \tilde{Q}_{ID}^*, \tilde{e}_2^*, \tilde{c}^*)$ such that $\tilde{e}_1^* \neq \tilde{e}_2^*$ with probability $\varepsilon' \geq \frac{1 - e^{-1}}{t_H}\varepsilon$.

In this case, $h(\hat{z}_1^*) = \tilde{Y}^*\tilde{c}^* + \tilde{S}\tilde{e}_1^* + \tilde{Q}_{ID}^*$ and $h(\hat{z}_2^*) = \tilde{Y}^*\tilde{c}^* + \tilde{S}\tilde{e}_2^* + \tilde{Q}_{ID}^*$. Thus, it is easy to obtain $h(\hat{z}_1^* - msk\tilde{e}_1^*) = h(\hat{z}_2^* - msk\tilde{e}_2^*)$, where $\hat{z}_1^* - msk\tilde{e}_1^* \neq \hat{z}_2^* - msk\tilde{e}_2^*$ with a probability of at least 0.5. Now, we have a collision for h with probability $\varepsilon'/2 \geq \frac{1 - e^{-1}}{2t_H}\varepsilon$.

According to Theorem 1 in Section 2.2 and

Lemma 1 in Section 3.3, we can obtain the following theorem:

Theorem 2 Our IBS scheme is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of $SVP_\gamma(\Lambda)$ for every $(x^n + 1)$ -cyclic lattice Λ .

3.4 Efficiency

As far as we know, the most efficient IBS schemes on lattices in the random oracle model were proposed by Tian and Huang (2014) and Xie et al. (2016). The scheme in Xie et al. (2016) is based on NTRU lattices. The memory requirement of the scheme based on NTRU lattices is always lower than that based on a general lattice. Thus, the size of the scheme in Xie et al. (2016) is smaller than that of our scheme. The size of our scheme is smaller than that of the scheme proposed by Tian and Huang (2014). Comparison of the scheme size is shown in Table 2. Here, n is a security parameter, λ , k , m' , and m are positive integers, p and q are primes, $m' > 5n \log q$, $m = \log n$, $\hat{s} = n^{2.5} \sqrt{2q} \omega(\sqrt{n})$, $s = O(\sqrt{n \log q}) \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$, $\hat{\sigma} = 12\lambda \hat{s} n$, $\sigma = 12s \lambda m'$, $d = m^2 n^{1.5}$, and $p = 4d^2$. Table 3 shows the approximate sizes of the concrete instances.

However, the Gaussian sampling algorithm was employed in the extract algorithm of the scheme in Xie et al. (2016). In Tian and Huang (2014), not only the Gaussian sampling algorithm but also the trapdoor generation algorithm was employed. However, there is no sampling or trapdoor generation algorithm in our scheme. The computation complexity of our scheme is lower than those of other schemes. Furthermore, their schemes are existen-

tially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model. Our scheme is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model. Comparison of the computation complexity and security is shown in Table 4.

Table 4 Comparison of the computation complexity and security

Scheme	Gaussian sampling	Trapdoor generation	Security
Xie et al. (2016)'s	Yes	Yes	EU-CMA
Tian and Huang (2014)'s	Yes	Yes	EU-CMA
Ours	No	No	SU-CMA

Therefore, our scheme is not optimal in size, but has lower computation complexity and higher security.

4 Conclusions

By studying Lyubashevsky's scheme, we can know how the lattice-based signature scheme avoids using the sampling or trapdoor technique. Thus, we have constructed a new IBS scheme based on lattices. Our scheme does not use the sampling or trapdoor technique. This makes our scheme more computationally efficient than prior schemes. We have proved that our scheme is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model. Based on our scheme, other signature schemes with special properties can be constructed. At present, our identity-based blind signature scheme based on lattices is already under preparation.

Table 2 Comparison of the scheme size

Scheme	Signing key size (bit)	Signature size (bit)
Xie et al. (2016)'s	$2n \log(\hat{s} \sqrt{n})$	$2n \log(12\hat{\sigma}) + n(\log \lambda + 1)$
Tian and Huang (2014)'s	$m' k \log(s \sqrt{m'})$	$m' \log(12\sigma) + \lambda(\log k + 1)$
Ours	$mn \log(2d) + n \log p$	$mn \log(2d) + n \log p$

Table 3 Approximate sizes of the concrete instances

Instance	n	k	λ	q	p	Signing key size (bit)		Signature size (bit)	
						Tian and Huang (2014)	This work	Tian and Huang (2014)	This work
1	512	80	30	2^{27}	2^{43}	97 348 883	117 738	2 603 000	117 738
2	512	512	30	2^{25}	2^{45}	573 255 678	118 762	2 399 338	118 762
3	512	512	30	2^{33}	2^{47}	773 966 620	119 786	3 218 019	119 786

Contributors

Jiang-shan CHEN designed the research. Jiang-shan CHEN and Hong-mei LIANG processed the data. Jiang-shan CHEN drafted the manuscript. Wen GAO helped organize the manuscript. Jiang-shan CHEN and Yu-pu HU revised and finalized the paper.

Compliance with ethics guidelines

Jiang-shan CHEN, Yu-pu HU, Hong-mei LIANG, and Wen GAO declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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