

(Full) Leakage Resilience of Fiat-Shamir Signatures over Lattices

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Problems & Ideas

- The security of lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signature (FS-Sig) schemes in the presence of leakage is a relatively under-explored topic.
 - Fiat-Shamir is a mainstream construction paradigm of lattice-based signature schemes.
 - Some side-channel attacks on lattice-based FS-Sig schemes have been proposed since 2016, little work on the leakage resilience appears .
- The proof idea of the leakage resilience of FS-Sig schemes based on traditional number-theoretic assumptions does not apply to most lattice-based FS-Sig schemes.




Fig.1 The Original Proof Idea in [ADW09, KV09, DHLAW10b]

Main Contributions

- The work proposes a framework to construct fully leakage resilient lattice-based FS-Sig schemes in the bounded memory leakage (BML) model.
 - First, the work constructs leakage resilient FS-Sig schemes in BML model from non-lossy or lossy identification (ID) schemes and instantiates ID schemes based on lattice assumptions.
 - Second, the work constructs fully leakage resilient FS-Sig schemes from leakage resilient ones.




Fig.2 The High-Level Overview of Our Framework