%A XU Xiangdong %T Thomas Reid on Active Power and Free Agency %0 Journal Article %D 2011 %J Front. Philos. China %J Frontiers of Philosophy in China %@ 1673-3436 %R 10.1007/s11466-011-0145-3 %P 369-389 %V 6 %N 3 %U {https://journal.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.1007/s11466-011-0145-3 %8 2011-09-05 %X

The paper argues that it is a mistake to interpret Thomas Reid as holding a libertarian notion of freedom, and to make use of Reid to argue in support of a libertarian position. More precisely, this paper shows that Reid’s theory of agent-causation may not be what these philosophers take it to be, once such crucial notions as agent-causation and active power in Reid’s theory of free agency have been fully explicated. Reid is more committed to accepting the view of freedom as rational self-control over the determination of the will than a contracausal view of freedom.