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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front. Philos. China    2019, Vol. 14 Issue (2) : 303-321
Luck, Control, and Contrastive Explanation
XU Xiangdong()
Department of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310028, China
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This paper is aimed to show how the libertarian conception of free choice is mistaken or misleading by focusing on Robert Kane’s attempt to solve the problem of luck, which arguably constitutes the most serious challenge to libertarianism about free will. I will argue that either Kane’s solution to the problem of luck falls into some inconsistency or he must introduce the requirement of contrastive explanation into his account of plural voluntary control. Either way, Kane fails to show how his emphasis on the requirement of plural voluntary control is made consistent with his unswerving commitment to the requirement of the libertarian free will for a metaphysical indeterminism.

Keywords luck      plural voluntary control      reasons for action      rational explanation     
Issue Date: 15 July 2019
 Cite this article:   
XU Xiangdong. Luck, Control, and Contrastive Explanation[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2019, 14(2): 303-321.
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