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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front Phil Chin    2013, Vol. 8 Issue (4) : 670-682
research-article |
Knowledge, Presupposition, and Pragmatic Implicature
XU Zhaoqing()
Department of Philosophy, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
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It is widely accepted that knowledge is factive, but two different understandings of “factivity” should be distinguished, namely, the implication version and the presupposition version. While the former only takes the truth of P as a necessary requirement for “S knows that P,” the latter considers it also necessary for “S does not know that P.” In this paper, I argue against presupposition and defend implication. More specifically, I argue against Wang and Tai’s defense of the presupposition version as presented in a recent paper and propose a pragmatic response to the “persistence problem” of implication. In other words, my positive proposal is an account of implication plus pragmatic implicature. To conclude, I use my version to analyze Wang and Tai’s distinction between inner skepticism and outer skepticism. My conclusion is that, after abandoning presupposition, we can identify two types of intermediate skepticism between Wang and Tai’s inner and outer skepticism.

Keywords inner skepticism      knowing that      knowing whether      intermediate skepticism      outer skepticism      persistence problem      presupposition      pragmatic implicature     
Corresponding Authors: XU Zhaoqing,   
Issue Date: 05 December 2013
 Cite this article:   
XU Zhaoqing. Knowledge, Presupposition, and Pragmatic Implicature[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(4): 670-682.
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[1] TANG Refeng. Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2011, 6(3): 426-442.
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