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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front. Philos. China    2016, Vol. 11 Issue (2) : 263-278
Orginal Article |
Delusional Beliefs, Two-Factor Theories, and Bizarreness
NIE Chenwei()
School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
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In order to explain delusional beliefs, one must first consider what factors should be included in a theory of delusion. Unlike a one-factor theory, a two-factor theory of delusion argues that not only anomalous experience (the first factor) but also an impairment of the belief-evaluation system (the second factor) is required. Recently, two-factor theorists have adopted various Bayesian approaches in order to give a more accurate description of delusion formation. By reviewing the progression from a one-factor theory to a two-factor theory, I argue that in light of the second factor’s requirements, different proposed impairments can be unified within a consistent belief-evaluation system. Under this interpretation of the second factor, I further argue that the role of a mechanism responsible for detecting bizarreness is wrongly neglected. I conclude that the second factor is a compound system which consists of differing functional parts, one of which functions to detect bizarreness in different stages of delusion; moreover, I hold that the impairment can be one or several of these functional parts.

Keywords delusion      two-factor theories      Bayesian theory      bizarreness     
Issue Date: 21 July 2016
 Cite this article:   
NIE Chenwei. Delusional Beliefs, Two-Factor Theories, and Bizarreness[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(2): 263-278.
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