Please wait a minute...

Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front. Philos. China    2014, Vol. 9 Issue (1) : 69-86     https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-003-014-0005-4
research-article |
The Consolations of Boethius
John Lamont()
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Fitzroy Victoria 3065, Australia
Download: PDF(263 KB)  
Export: BibTeX | EndNote | Reference Manager | ProCite | RefWorks
Abstract

The paper considers the account of happiness given in Boethius’s Consolations of Philosophy. This account claims that happiness requires security of possession, and argues from this requirement to the conclusion that worldly goods, which of their nature cannot be securely possessed, cannot provide happiness. This argument is shown to depend on assuming a life-driven account of human motivation, rather than a goods-driven account of human motivation. The life-driven account, according to which voluntary actions are ultimately motivated by the pursuit of a certain kind of life, is defended against the goods-driven account, according to which actions are motivated by the pursuit of goods the enjoyment of which can only be episodes in a human life. It is claimed that Boethius is right in holding a life-driven account, and that his account of happiness follows from it.

Keywords happiness      hedonism      utilitarianism      virtue      action      Boethius      MacIntyre     
Issue Date: 16 May 2014
 Cite this article:   
John Lamont. The Consolations of Boethius[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2014, 9(1): 69-86.
 URL:  
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-003-014-0005-4
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2014/V9/I1/69
Service
E-mail this article
E-mail Alert
RSS
Articles by authors
John Lamont
Related articles from Frontiers Journals
[1] CHEN Yajun. Between Darwin and Hegel: On Dewey’s Concept of Experience[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2017, 12(1): 104-119.
[2] Alicia Hennig. Three Different Approaches to Virtue in Business- Aristotle, Confucius, and Lao Zi[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(4): 556-586.
[3] Jeevan F. D’Souza,C. Kelly Adams. On Measuring the Moral Value of Action[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(1): 122-136.
[4] Teun Tieleman. The Early Stoics and Aristotelian Ethics[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(1): 104-121.
[5] Joanna Guzowska. The Spatiality of Cognition in the Zhuangzi[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(3): 415-429.
[6] Michael Slote. From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(3): 430-443.
[7] XU Zhaoqing. On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(2): 298-310.
[8] Eva Kit Wah Man. A Cross-Cultural Reflection on Shusterman’s Suggestion of the “Transactional” Body[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(2): 181-191.
[9] Bongrae Seok. Moral Psychology of Shame in Early Confucian Philosophy[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(1): 21-57.
[10] Rajesh C. Shukla. Justice and Civic Friendship: An Aristotelian Critique of Modern Citizenry[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2014, 9(1): 1-20.
[11] LU Qiaoying. Aquinas’s Transformation of the Virtue of Courage[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(3): 471-484.
[12] LIU Jing. Kant’s Virtue as Strength[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(3): 451-470.
[13] WANG Kai. Xunzi: A Paradigm of Rationalistic Virtue Ethics in Early Confucianism[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(3): 388-396.
[14] CHEN Lai. The Basic Character of the Virtue Theory of Mencius’ Philosophy and Its Significance in Classical Confucianism[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(1): 4-21.
[15] Gerard Walmsley. Is There a Place for Traditional Values and Virtues in Society Today?[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2013, 8(1): 31-52.
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed