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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front Phil Chin    2012, Vol. 7 Issue (2) : 304-316     https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-001-012-0018-4
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The Knowledge Argument against Physicalism: Its Proponents and Its Opponents
ZHAO Yanyan()
Department of Philosophy, Fujian Academy of Social Sciences, Fuzhou 350001, China
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Abstract

The knowledge argument usually takes the form of a thought experiment where the subject, having some psychological deficiency, lacks any introspective data to derive the knowledge of her experience. Most defenders of the knowledge argument see the argument as both a support of dualism and an objection to any full-blooded form of physicalism. However, this paper argues that the knowledge argument against physicalism may be directed, in an exactly parallel form, against reductive dualism; moreover, although most physicalists who are the opponents of the knowledge argument do not give any convincing response to the knowledge argument, some kinds of physicalism can live with the knowledge argument.

Keywords knowledge argument      physicalism      dualism     
Corresponding Authors: ZHAO Yanyan,Email:zyy.fj@live.cn   
Issue Date: 05 June 2012
 Cite this article:   
ZHAO Yanyan. The Knowledge Argument against Physicalism: Its Proponents and Its Opponents[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2012, 7(2): 304-316.
 URL:  
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.3868/s030-001-012-0018-4
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2012/V7/I2/304
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