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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front. Philos. China    2006, Vol. 1 Issue (4) : 675-687     https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-006-0031-6
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A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples
Cao Jianbo
Department of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China; Department of Philosophy, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China
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Abstract Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.
Issue Date: 05 December 2006
 Cite this article:   
Cao Jianbo. A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2006, 1(4): 675-687.
 URL:  
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/10.1007/s11466-006-0031-6
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fpc/EN/Y2006/V1/I4/675
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