Please wait a minute...
 首页  期刊列表 期刊订阅 开放获取 关于我们
English
在线预览  |  当期目录  |  过刊浏览  |  热点文章  |  下载排行
Frontiers of Engineering Management    2019, Vol. 6 Issue (1) : 87-101     https://doi.org/10.1007/s42524-019-0006-7
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Internal incentives and operations strategies for the water-saving supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation
Zhisong CHEN1,2, Li FANG3, Huimin WANG4,5,6()
1. Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China
2. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA
3. Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China
4. State Key Laboratory of Hydrology-Water Resources and Hydraulic Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China
5. Business School, Hohai University, Jiangning District, Nanjing 211100, China
6. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
全文: PDF(914 KB)   HTML
导出: BibTeX | EndNote | Reference Manager | ProCite | RefWorks
Abstract

Faced with the rapid development of modern industries of agriculture, manufacturing, and services, water resources are becoming increasingly scarce. Industries with high water consumption are generally regulated by the government’s water cap-and-trade (CAT) regulation to solve the contradiction between the limited water supply and the rapid growing water demand. Supply chain equilibrium and coordination models under the benchmark scenario without water saving and CAT regulation, water-saving supply chain equilibrium and coordination models under the scenario without/with CAT regulation are developed, analyzed and compared. The corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses for all models are conducted and compared, and the managerial insights and policy recommendations are summarized in this article. The results indicate that (1) Conducting water saving could improve effectively the operational performance of the water-saving supply chain under the scenario without/with CAT regulation. (2) The coordination strategy based on the revenue sharing contract could efficiently coordinate the water-saving supply chain, enhance water consumption reduction rate, and improve the operational performance of the water-saving supply chain. (3) The implementation of CAT regulation enhances effectively water-consumption-reduction in the water-saving supply chain and improves the operational performance of water-saving supply chain. (4) Simultaneous implementation of CAT regulation by the government and adopting coordination strategy by the water-saving supply chain would be superior to any other scenarios/strategies. (5) A suitable water cap based on the industrial average water consumption and historical water consumption data are beneficial for constructing reasonable and effective incentive mechanism. (6) A higher marginal trade price could induce more reduction in water consumption and create better operational performance for the manufacturer and water-saving supply chain, both under the equilibrium and coordination strategies.

Keywords water-saving supply chain      equilibrium      coordination      internal incentive      cap and trade regulation     
在线预览日期:    发布日期: 2019-03-12
服务
推荐给朋友
免费邮件订阅
RSS订阅
作者相关文章
Zhisong CHEN
Li FANG
Huimin WANG
引用本文:   
Zhisong CHEN,Li FANG,Huimin WANG. Internal incentives and operations strategies for the water-saving supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation[J]. Front. Eng, 2019, 6(1): 87-101.
网址:  
https://journal.hep.com.cn/fem/EN/10.1007/s42524-019-0006-7     OR     https://journal.hep.com.cn/fem/EN/Y2019/V6/I1/87
Scenario Benchmark scenario Scenario without CAT Scenario with CAT
Equilibrium Coordination Equilibrium Coordination Equilibrium Coordination
r* - - 41.15% 82.58% 49.27% 99.02%
w* 1,285.00 35.00 1,280.94 26.74 1,281.15 25.10
p* 1,892.50 1,285.00 1,890.52 1,276.85 1,890.64 1,275.24
q* 1,215.00 2,430.00 1,219.17 2,446.72 1,218.97 2,450.01
Πr* 738,112.50 1,476,225.00 743,183.01 1,481,383.50 742,948.33 1,483,432.69
Πm* 1,476,225.00 1,476,225.00 1,471,286.83 1,481,383.50 1,473,614.98 1,483,432.69
Πs c* 2,214,337.50 2,952,450.00 2,214,469.85 2,962,767.00 2,216,563.31 2,966,865.38
φ* - [0.2500, 0.5000] - [0.2508, 0.5034] - [0.2504, 0.5033]
Tab.1  Numerical results of water-saving supply chain without/with CAT regulation
Fig.1  Effects of water cap change on the profits of retailer, water-saving manufacturer and water-saving supply chain under the equilibrium strategy
Fig.2  Effects of water cap change on the profits of retailer, water-saving manufacturer and water-saving supply chain under the coordination strategy
l rdt wdt pdt qdt Πrtd Πmtd Πs ctd
0.5 49.27% 1,281.15 1,890.64 1,218.97 742,948.33 1,473,614.98 2,216,563.31
0.4 47.64% 1,281.13 1,890.63 1,218.99 742,963.47 1,473,117.65 2,216,081.12
0.3 46.02% 1,281.10 1,890.61 1,219.01 742,994.52 1,472,636.16 2,215,630.68
0.2 44.39% 1,281.06 1,890.59 1,219.05 743,041.47 1,472,170.53 2,215,212.00
0.1 42.77% 1,281.01 1,890.56 1,219.10 743,104.30 1,471,720.75 2,214,825.06
Tab.2  Sensitivity analysis results of marginal trade price under the equilibrium strategy
l rct wct pct qct Πrtc Πmtc Πs ctc
0.5 99.02% 25.10 1,275.24 2,450.01 1,483,432.69 1,483,432.69 2,966,865.38
0.4 95.72% 25.43 1,275.62 2,449.25 1,482,958.43 1,482,958.43 2,965,916.86
0.3 92.43% 25.76 1,275.96 2,448.54 1,482,516.44 1,482,516.44 2,965,032.88
0.2 89.14% 26.09 1,276.28 2,447.88 1,482,106.65 1,482,106.65 2,964,213.31
0.1 85.86% 26.41 1,276.58 2,447.27 1,481,729.02 1,481,729.02 2,963,458.05
Tab.3  Sensitivity analysis results of marginal trade price under the coordination strategy
Fig.3  Effect of marginal trade price change on the profits of retailer, water-saving manufacturer and water-saving supply chain under the equilibrium strategy
Fig.4  Effect of marginal trade price change on the profits of retailer, water-saving manufacturer and water-saving supply chain under the coordination strategy
1 ACampisano, G D’Amico, CModica (2017). Water saving and cost analysis of large-scale implementation of domestic rain water harvesting in minor Mediterranean Islands. Water (Basel), 9(12): 1–14
2 HGao, T Wei, ILou, ZYang, Z Shen, YLi (2014). Water saving effect on integrated water resource management. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 93: 50–58
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2014.09.009
3 AGilg, S Barr (2006). Behavioural attitudes towards water saving? Evidence from a study of environmental actions. Ecological Economics, 57(3): 400–414
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.04.010
4 YHu, J P Moiwo, Y Yang, SHan, YYang (2010). Agricultural water-saving and sustainable groundwater management in Shijiazhuang Irrigation District, North China Plain. Journal of Hydrology (Amsterdam), 393(3–4): 219–232
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2010.08.017
5 JJi, Z Zhang, LYang (2017). Comparisons of initial carbon allowance allocation rules in an O2O retail supply chain with the cap-and-trade regulation. International Journal of Production Economics, 187: 68–84
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.02.011
6 J MKhatib (2015). Energy, Environmental & Sustainable Ecosystem Development: International Conference on Energy, Environmental & Sustainable Ecosystem Development (EESED 2015). Singapore: World Scientific
7 HLiu, J Guo, WHe (2014). The research on subject behavioral risk of whole life-cycle water conservation projects. Frontiers of Engineering Management, 1(4): 348–352
https://doi.org/10.15302/J-FEM-2014048
8 YLu, C Shang (2014). The environmental impact of the three gorges project and the countermeasures. Frontiers of Engineering Management, 1(2): 120–128
https://doi.org/10.15302/J-FEM-2014019
9 JLuckmann, H Grethe, SMcDonald (2016). When water saving limits recycling: Modelling economy-wide linkages of wastewater use. Water Research, 88: 972–980
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.watres.2015.11.004
10 FMonaco, G Sali, M BHassen, AFacchi, MRomani, GValè (2016). Water management options for rice cultivation in a temperate area: A multi-objective model to explore economic and water saving results. Water (Basel), 8(8): 1–21
https://doi.org/10.3390/w8080336
11 ANikouei, M Zibaei, F AWard (2012). Incentives to adopt irrigation water saving measures for wetlands preservation: An integrated basin scale analysis. Journal of Hydrology (Amsterdam), 464–465: 216–232
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2012.07.013
12 JNovak, M Melenhorst, IMicheel, CPasini, PFraternali, A ERizzoli (2018). Integrating behavioural change and gamified incentive modelling for stimulating water saving. Environmental Modelling & Software, 102: 120–137
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2017.11.038
13 J EØrum, M VBoesen, ZJovanovic, S MPedersen (2010). Farmers’ incentives to save water with new irrigation systems and water taxation–A case study of Serbian potato production. Agricultural Water Management, 98(3): 465–471
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agwat.2010.10.019
14 J MPeterson, Y Ding (2005). Economic adjustments to groundwater depletion in the high plains: Do water-saving irrigation systems save water? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87(1): 147–159
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0002-9092.2005.00708.x
15 HShang, S Zhou, LZhang (2008). Circular Economy Development Evaluation and Policy Design. Beijing: China Financial & Economic Publishing House
16 E AVarouchakis, AApostolakis, MSiaka, KVasilopoulos, ATasiopoulos (2018). Alternatives for domestic water tariff policy in the municipality of Chania, Greece, toward water saving using game theory. Water Policy, 20(1): 175–188
https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2017.182
17 WWAP (United Nations World Water Assessment Programme) (2015). The United Nations World Water Development Report 2015: Water for a Sustainable World. Paris: UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)
18 GXie (2015). Modelling decision processes of a green supply chain with regulation on energy saving level. Computers & Operations Research, 54: 266–273
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2013.11.020
19 BXin, M Sun (2018). A differential oligopoly game for optimal production planning and water savings. European Journal of Operational Research, 269(1): 206–217
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.07.016
20 XXu, P He, XHao, QZhang (2017). Supply chain coordination with green technology under cap-and-trade regulation. International Journal of Production Economics, 183: 433–442
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.08.029
21 XXu, W Zhang, PHe, XXu (2017). Production and pricing problems in make-to-order supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation. Omega, 66: 248–257
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2015.08.006
22 YYi, J Li (2018). Cost-Sharing contracts for energy saving and emissions reduction of a supply chain under the conditions of government subsidies and a carbon tax. Sustainability, 10(3): 895
https://doi.org/10.3390/su10030895
23 DZhang, P Guo (2016). Integrated agriculture water management optimization model for water saving potential analysis. Agricultural Water Management, 170: 5–19
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agwat.2015.11.004
24 LZhou, K Xu, XCheng, YXu, Q Jia (2017). Study on optimizing production scheduling for water-saving in textile dyeing industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 141: 721–727
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.09.047
No related articles found!
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
版权所有 © 2015 高等教育出版社.
电话: 010-58556848 (技术); 010-58556485 (订阅) E-mail: subscribe@hep.com.cn