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Frontiers of Economics in China

Front. Econ. China    2015, Vol. 10 Issue (3) : 467-482
A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information
Wenzhang Zhang()
School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
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In this paper I present a syntactic approach to modeling the interactive knowledge of rationality in finite games of perfect information. This approach allows for a more transparent interpretation. In particular, we have the intuitive picture of viewing knowledge as the input and decisions as the output of a player’s deliberation. This distinction is blurred in the semantic state-space approach.

Keywords knowledge      rationality      backward induction      games of perfect information     
Issue Date: 22 October 2015
 Cite this article:   
Wenzhang Zhang. A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information[J]. Front. Econ. China, 2015, 10(3): 467-482.
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